E - Iccat

WG TRADE RESTRICTIVE MEASURES - FUNCHAL 2003
eliminate IUU fishing. It reminds us of the main focus of such a meeting, namely, the creation of procedural
rules (to deliberate on criteria and procedure), instead of making new substitutive law (measures to counter IUU
fishing). In this context, we support the idea underlying the Japan/Canada/U.S. draft resolution, i.e., to create a
transparent and fair procedure to supplement the existing UU Catches Resolution. Meanwhile, we appreciate the
EC’s efforts in providing two draft resolutions to give separate treatment to non-Contracting Parties, on the one
hand, and Contracting Parties and Cooperating non-Contracting Parties, Entities or Fishing Entities on the other
hand. The differential approach by the EC is commendable for meeting one of the mandates of such a Working
Group, namely, to lay out the differences between Contracting Parties and non-Contracting Parties. We are fully
aware of the possible compromise between two such kinds of approaches in the course of the Working Group
meeting. To be emphasized, whatever way the Working Group meeting should decide to take, it is necessary that
the resulting draft document be capable of fitting in with the existing ICCAT measures and serve as a truly
supplementary tool, instead of creating a brand new measure.
2. Any criterion which is by nature vague and incapable of objective judgment cannot serve as a useful tool
for imposing TRM fairly, transparently, and consistently.
Among the mandates of the Working Group meeting is the further development and elaboration of criteria
allowing for the imposition or removal of trade restrictive measures (TRM) in a fair, transparent, consistent and
non-discriminatory manner. Any criterion that is by nature vague and incapable of objective judgment, cannot
serve as a useful tool for imposing TRM fairly, transparently and consistently. The criteria listed in paragraph
B.2 (h) of the Japan/Canada/U.S. (see Annex 9.3 of the 2002 Commission Report) draft resolutions as well as in
paragraph 3(f) of the EC draft resolution (see Annex 9.1 of the 2002 Commission Report) cannot be evaluated by
any objective standard. Such criteria, being in conflict with the guiding principle underlying the above mandate,
should be deleted to avoid jeopardizing the integrity of such draft resolution.
3. Inherently the making of the list of certain activities diminishing the effectiveness of ICCAT conservation
measures is to list out clear criteria. It is inappropriate to employ the catchall provision.
Under the above-mentioned mandate, the rasion d’etre of paragraph B of the Japan/Canada/U.S. draft resolution
(Annex 9.3 of the 2002 Commission Report) is to list certain irregular activities commonly considered to reach
the higher level of seriousness so as to justify the imposition of the grave trade restrictive measures (TRM).
Inherently, the making of the list of certain activities diminishing the effectiveness of ICCAT conservation
measures is to list out clear criteria. It is inappropriate to employ the catchall provision like sub-paragraph 2(g).
For the sake of consistency in the logic of paragraph B, we suggest that sub-paragraph 2(g) be deleted.
4. The larger vessels are capable of posing much greater threat to fisheries resources management. They
should be dealt with by ICCAT as a matter of urgency.
With respect to the vessels to be regulated by the various draft resolutions, there are two approaches to be
considered. One is the EC approach that focuses on all fishing vessels. The other approach adopted by the
Japan/Canada/U.S. draft resolution is to apply their Supplementary Procedure to LSTLVs. We are of the opinion
that vessels larger that 24 meters in length should be the target of ICCAT regulations to be adopted by the
Working Group meeting. Since large-scale vessels are capable of posing much greater threat to fisheries
resources management, they should be dealt with by ICCAT as matter of urgency.
5. The composition of Compliance Committee should reflect the basic principle of universal participation.
A designated Compliance Committee with the authority to identify any offence of the ICCAT cannot exclude all
interested parties in ICCAT from participating in its operation. Thus, we strongly suggest that, apart from
Contracting Parties of ICCAT, Cooperating non-Contracting Parties have a meaningful and constructive position
in the Compliance Committee.
6. The national implementation of ICCAT´s recommendation using trade sanctions should be under a proper
supervision. A dispute settlement mechanism among Parties over the imposition of trade-related measures
should be formulated.
Certainly, the use of trade measures is unable to achieve its goal without national enforcement action. In order to
deter the abuse of such means and to prevent undesirable trade barriers, a more delicate device should be
formulated to supervise any individual trade ban. In addition, as the international community generally prefers
multilateral approach to unilateral measure, we are of the view that any members of ICCAT should refrain from
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