The Power of Persistence: Education System ... - EQUIP123.net

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Nicaragua Education Indicators Indicator 1991 1999 2006 Number of primary students (000) - 830,000 966,000 GER Primary 91% 100% 116% NER Primary 70% 76% 90% Survival to Grade 5 44% 48% 54% GER Secondary - 52% 66% teacher Pupil Ratio 32:1 34:1 33:1 Gross intake ratio - primary - 141% 168% Gender Equity Ratio (Girls:boys)—Primary 1.06 1.01 .98 Repetition rate–primary - 4.7% 9.5% Education as % of govt budget - 6% - Education as % of GNP - 4.0% 3.3% $ Per pupil, current spending $331 CASE ANALySIS: DIMENSIONS OF REFORM Technical Dimensions USAID, the World Bank, and other donors have supported various educational reforms and system improvements in Nicaragua; initiatives have focused on strategic planning, decentralization, financial management, information and decision systems, learning materials and textbooks, and disaster recovery, among other topics. Two core long-term reform initiatives that began at approximately the same time, the Autonomous Schools Program and the Escuelas Activas initiative, stand out and are deserving of particular attention. In 1990 the new Minister of Education, Humberto Belli, immediately spearheaded the ASP in an effort to improve school quality while reversing the heavily centralized Sandinista Ministry of Education. Supported by the World Bank, which advocated decentralization of education and funded the program, Minister Belli became a champion of this reform effort and moved it quickly from a pilot to a national reform effort. The consejos directives established under ASP allowed local boards to adjust the curriculum and address technical issues such as testing, but due to a lack of capacity in these areas, the initiative eventually concentrated more on administrative areas such as the collection of school fees and hiring and firing of teachers. This project continued until it was ended under the current Minister of Education. In 1993, USAID’s program of support to the Ministry of Education initiated more a decade of commitment to educational system reform in Nicaragua. The centerpiece of the USAID-supported Nicaraguan education reforms was at the SECTION 2: lESSONS fROM COUNTRY CASE STUdIES 103
school and classroom level, establishing effective models of school management and student-centered teaching in the classroom. The BASE Projects introduced a method of active instruction adapted from the Escuela Nueva model to meet the needs of Nicaragua. The model was specifically designed to address the needs of teachers working in the most disadvantaged rural, multi-grade schools, where all grades are taught together in one room, but it is also effective in larger, urban schools. From an initial start in 40 model schools in 1995, the project has expanded over time through additional model schools and through a network of satellite schools linked to each model school, reaching 170 schools at the end of the BASE II Project in 2005 and 3,015 in 2009. The program currently supports 48 percent of the country’s primary school students. Along with the formal expansion network of mentors schools and satellite schools, teachers who are reassigned to new schools have often carried the reforms with them and in this way increased the overall receptiveness of the program across the country and expanded the reach of the project. The program now reaches all municipalities in the country and is currently being institutionalized in the Ministry as part of the Minister’s model for quality education. Institutional Dimensions Education in Nicaragua has often been highly politicized, and for much of the time period from 1990 to the present, the central-level Nicaraguan Ministry of Education was institutionally weak and did not develop or articulate a clear and consensus-based policy framework that defined national priorities and commitments. Frequent changes in Ministers, the tendency to discontinue policies started by predecessors, and the lack of technical capacity and financial resources that beset the Ministry have limited the Ministry of Education’s institutional effectiveness. Certain Ministers of Education, such as Humberto Belli and Silvio de Franco, however, did exhibit strong leadership that proved instrumental to the implementation of policies. For example, the Autonomous Schools Policy (ASP) was a high-profile program that was a priority for Minister Belli, and he was able to initiate, implement, and expand it rapidly. In part this was due to the absence of an initial legal framework, as Minister Belli was able to implement ASP right away using only ministerial directives. As opposed to having established a legal framework before implementation of the programs, the ministry was afforded some flexibility and time for trial and error before its institutionalization into policy (Gershberg, 2002). Had he waited for the legal framework to be in place, ASP never would have expanded to national level as quickly as it did. Additionally, Minister Belli’s drive and conviction, and his ability and willingness to work closely with donors, were instrumental in the establishment and rapid implementation of the program. 104 SECTION 2: lESSONS fROM COUNTRY CASE STUdIES
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The Power of Persistence Education
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table of Contents Acknowledgments F
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generously granted us their time an
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Foreword The United States Agency f
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Executive Summary EQUIP2 Education
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local points of contact. In fact, b
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Namibia has successfully developed
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Sustainability in the context of sy
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• Manage policy engagement and re
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After more than 50 years of develop
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to the point of functional literacy
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An obvious question for donors is
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• Was the investment in education
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A final perspective on ownership, a
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and recipients. The World Bank has
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the term differently. Donors someti
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Country commitment to improving pol
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The importance of these insights, b
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Table: Simple, Complicated, and Com
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Basic principles of systems thinkin
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Among the many aspects of systems t
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EQUIP2 Education Systems Reform Fra
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may or may not be influenced by the
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• There are no magic bullets. Par
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These case studies look at educatio
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El Salvador Egypt Namibia Nicaragua
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eform support during the 1980s and
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system. In the same year, the USAID
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CASE ANALySIS: DIMENSIONS OF REFORM
Page 66 and 67: increased during this period, parti
Page 68 and 69: militant groups (at least until 199
Page 70 and 71: the growing political will and capa
Page 72 and 73: political will and experience in bo
Page 75 and 76: EgyPT TIMELINE
Page 78 and 79: El Salvador: Summary COUNTRy CONTEx
Page 80 and 81: financing, and ensuring adequate le
Page 82 and 83: Impact Structurally, the education
Page 84 and 85: CASE ANALySIS: DIMENSIONS OF REFORM
Page 86 and 87: 2005, USAID assistance further stre
Page 88 and 89: EDUCO’s success exemplifies a tec
Page 90 and 91: workshop with representatives of bo
Page 92: • The continuing commitment to th
Page 95: El Salvador Time Line Before 1988 1
Page 98 and 99: Strategies Especially in the early
Page 100 and 101: In terms of quality, the impact on
Page 102 and 103: The second aspect is that the profe
Page 104 and 105: • The complex and holistic nature
Page 106 and 107: efforts have been studied closely,
Page 109 and 110: NAMIBIA TIMELINE
Page 112 and 113: Nicaragua: Summary COUNTRy CONTExT
Page 114 and 115: ASP won the support of donor agenci
Page 118 and 119: Though the strong leadership of Min
Page 120: eform. Starting from the early 1990
Page 123: Nicaragua Time Line Before 1986 198
Page 126 and 127: growth; primary enrollment expanded
Page 128 and 129: accountability and corruption led d
Page 130 and 131: Selected Reform goals, Policy Chang
Page 132 and 133: Increased sector leadership from MO
Page 134 and 135: it have to cope with major governme
Page 136 and 137: management and administration that
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Page 140 and 141: help an overextended MOE to meet se
Page 143 and 144: ZAMBIA TIMELINE
Page 146: 3 summary Findings and Conclusions
Page 149 and 150: In addition to an EFA-inspired emph
Page 151 and 152: from political changes. After 15 ye
Page 153 and 154: ased management, but were limited t
Page 155 and 156: is not necessarily limited to indiv
Page 157 and 158: sector limited the agenda-setting m
Page 159 and 160: and every new government seeks its
Page 161 and 162: 8. USAID and other donors have been
Page 163 and 164: CONCLUSIONS This review of five cou
Page 165 and 166: Ownership It is a central tenet of
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actors is a never-ending process. T
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was beyond the mandate of the Minis
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IMPLICATIONS FOR USAID POLICy AND P
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Bibliography general References Alv
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UNESCO. 2007. EFA Global Monitoring
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Healy, F. & Crouch, L. (2007, Novem
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Sidhom, S. & Al-Fustat, A. (2004, J
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Crouch, L., J. Gillies, A. Florez.
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LLECE, “Conclusiones del estudio
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Miller-Grandvaux, Yolande and Karla
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1875 Connecticut Ave., NW Washingto
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