View cases - Stewart McKelvey

Page: 104[400] That is, while the quasi-constitutional rights conferred by human rights legislation are to bebroadly interpreted, this is not so with respect to the defences provided in the human rights statute inquestion. Defences to the exercise of those rights are to be interpreted narrowly: see Brossard (Town)v. Québec (Commission des droits de la personne), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 279, [1988] S.C.J. No. 79 (QL)at para. 56, and Dickason, at para. 17.[401] As Justice Sopinka observed in Zurich Insurance Co. v. Ontario (Human Rights2011 FC 120 (CanLII)Commission) [1992] 2 S.C.R. 321, [1992] S.C.J. No. 63, human rights legislation is often “...thefinal refuge of the disadvantaged and the disenfranchised”. He went on to observe that “As the lastprotection of the most vulnerable members of society, exceptions to such legislation should benarrowly construed ...”: at para.18.[402] That is not to say that matters such as employee morale and mobility, interference with otheremployees’ rights, and disruption of a collective agreement could never be relevant in a claim underthe CHRA. Rather, my interpretation of the legislation simply means that in order to be taken intoaccount in an accommodation analysis, these matters must be of a sufficient gravity as to have ademonstrable impact on the operations of an employer in a way that relates to health, safety or cost.[403] Before leaving this matter, I would acknowledge that the Superior Court of Québec came toa different conclusion in relation to this question in Syndicat des employées et employésprofessionnelles et professionnels de bureau, section locale 434 (FTQ) c. Gagnon, [2005] J.Q. no9368, at para. 39. There, the Court stated that the list contained in paragraph 15(2) of the CHRA was