View cases - Stewart McKelvey

- 88 -as it does not bar the appellants from celebrating Succot in a succah, whether at thehomes of friends or family or even in a communal succah, as proposed by therespondent. Consequently, the prohibition against erecting their own succahs does notinfringe the purpose of the appellants’ right to freedom of religion. Any inconvenienceresulting from the prohibition against erecting individual succahs is not sufficient toelevate the preference to the status of a mandatory religious practice.2004 SCC 47 (CanLII)163 In the case of the appellant Amselem, however, the trial judge concluded thathe was [TRANSLATION] “the only one who saw the obligation to erect a succah on hisown property in terms of a divine command” (p. 1909). Assuming that his belief issincere, which the trial judge accepted, and that it is based on a precept of his religion,in accordance with the interpretation of the Book of Nechemiah, Chapter 8, verses 13 to18, accepted by Morin J.A. on appeal, it is necessary to turn to the second step and tointerpret the prohibitions imposed by the declaration of co-ownership in light of s. 9.1of the Quebec Charter to determine whether they violate Mr. Amselem’s right tofreedom of religion.2. Reconciling Rights Under Section 9.1 of the Quebec Charter164 Mr. Amselem contends that the restrictions contained in the declaration ofco-ownership infringe his right to freedom of religion under s. 3 of the Quebec Charter.According to s. 9.1 of that Charter, the right asserted by Mr. Amselem must be exercisedwith “proper regard for democratic values, public order and the general well-being of thecitizens of Québec”. If this right cannot be exercised in harmony with the rights andfreedoms of others and the general well-being of citizens, the infringement thereof maybe considered legitimate, and no violation of the right to freedom of religion provided