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27inappropriate to select out one prohibited ground of discrimination for a morerestrictive definition.121 In my respectful opinion, the concerns identified by the Court of Appeal,being serious workplace disruption and great mischief, might be proper matters forconsideration in the Meiorin analysis and in particular the third branch of theanalysis, being reasonable necessity. When evaluating the magnitude of hardship,an accommodation might give rise to matters such as serious disruption in theworkplace, and serious impact on employee morale are appropriate considerations(see Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta (Human Rights Commission) [1990]2 S.C.R. 489 at pp. 520 - 521). Undue hardship is to be proven by the employer ona case by case basis. A mere apprehension that undue hardship would result is nota proper reason, in my respectful opinion, to obviate the analysis. (The underliningis mine.)2010 CHRT 23 (CanLII)[99] In addition to the compelling logic of the Tribunal’s decision in Hoyt for not following theapproach in Campbell River, this Tribunal concludes that the approach suggested in that caseimposes an additional burden on the Complainant by suggesting that the protected ground offamily status includes proof of a “serious interference with a substantial parental or other familyduty or obligation” and that this is inconsistent with the purpose of the CHRA. As the SupremeCourt of Canada made it clear in B. v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 403,at para. 56, it is not appropriate, when interpreting human rights statutes, to impose additionalburdens.[100] The Tribunal’s approach in Hoyt was cited by the Federal Court of Canada in Johnstonev. Canada (Attorney General), [2007] F.C.J. No. 43, at paragraphs 29-30. This was an applicationfor judicial review by Ms. Johnstone of the decision of the CHRC to not refer her complaintalleging family status discrimination to the Tribunal.[101] In Johnstone, the Federal Court agreed with the approach of the Tribunal in Hoyt inregards to discrimination on the basis of family status, and stated that “...there is no obviousjustification for relegating this type of discrimination to a secondary or less compelling status.”(Johnstone, supra, at para. 29). The Court also stated that the suggestion of the British ColumbiaCourt of Appeal in the Campbell River case that prima facie discrimination will only arise wherethe employer changes the conditions of employment seems “to be unworkable and, with respect,