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[296] In Lavoie, Justice Bastarache described work as “a fundamental aspect of a person’s life”: atparagraph 45. Martin describes work and employment as being crucially important as elements ofessential human dignity under subsection 15(1) of the Charter: at paragraph 104. Indeed, in Wallace,the Supreme Court went so far as to describe work as one of the “defining features” of peoples’ lives:at paragraph 94.[297] The implications of being forced to retire against one’s will have also been discussed in thejurisprudence. In this regard, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé observed in her dissenting judgment inDickason that (at page 1192):Given the central importance that our society accords to career as a way of defining an individual’s status andself-worth, it is hardly surprising that being dismissed without cause on account of one‘s age is extremelytraumatic.[298] After reviewing the evidence with respect to the effects that mandatory retirement can haveon workers, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé went on in Dickason to observe that the shock of mandatoryretirement, together with the loss of earning power and productive work “often leads to physical andemotional deterioration and premature death”: at page 1193.2009 FC 367 (CanLII)[299] Similarly, in McKinney, the majority decision observed that “[i]n a work-oriented society,work is inextricably tied to the individual’s self-identity and self-worth”: at page 300. With this inmind, Justice LaForest went on in McKinney to draw a similar link between mandatory retirementand the loss of an individual’s self-worth, identity and emotional well-being.[300] That is, after recognizing the intrinsic importance of work to the individual, Justice LaForestheld that “[m]andatory retirement takes this away, on the basis of a personal characteristic attributedto an individual solely because of his association with a group”: McKinney, at page 278.[301] It once again bears repeating that what is in issue in this case is not Air Canada’s mandatoryretirement policy, but rather the provision of the Canadian Human Rights Act that denies individualssuch as Messrs. Vilven and Kelly the ability to challenge the company’s mandatory retirement policy.[302] That said, the comments of the Supreme Court with respect to the impact of mandatoryretirement on the self-esteem and dignity of individuals are directly relevant to the nature and scopeof the interest adversely affected by paragraph 15(1)(c) of the Canadian Human Rights Act.(v) Other observations[303] The Tribunal framed the Charter issue before it in the following terms [at paragraph 89]:“whether, as a result of the age-based distinction in s. 15(1)(c) of the CHRA, the complainants’dignity was affronted or they experienced negative stereotyping relating to their age.”[304] Much of the Tribunal’s ensuing Charter analysis is taken up with a discussion of Messrs.Vilven and Kelly’s dignity. As was noted earlier, the Tribunal did not have the benefit of theSupreme Court’s reasons in Kapp at the time that it rendered its decision in this matter. As aconsequence, its focus on Messrs. Vilven and Kelly’s dignity, and its use of dignity as a litmus testwith respect to subsection 15(1) of the Charter is understandable. Nevertheless, the Tribunal’s focuson the dignity issue serves as an example of the very problem that the Supreme Court identified inKapp.[305] That is, the Tribunal’s determination that having regard to all of the surroundingcircumstances, it could not reasonably be said that Messrs. Vilven and Kelly’s dignity was adverselyaffected by the fact that they were denied the opportunity to challenge Air Canada’s actions by virtueof paragraph 15(1)(c) of the Canadian Human Rights Act was necessarily a subjective one, relating towhat is essentially an abstract notion: see Kapp, at paragraph 22.