View cases - Stewart McKelvey

4724. Human rights legislation is intended to give rise, amongst other things, toindividual rights of vital importance, rights capable of enforcement, in the finalanalysis, in a court of law. I recognize that in the construction of such legislationthe words of the Act must be given their plain meaning, but it is equally importantthat the rights enunciated be given their full recognition and effect. We should notsearch for ways and means to minimize those rights and to enfeeble their properimpact. Although it may seem commonplace, it may be wise to remind ourselvesof the statutory guidance given by the federal Interpretation Act which asserts thatstatutes are deemed to be remedial and are thus to be given such fair, large andliberal interpretation as will best ensure that their objects are attained.[166] From the above analysis, the Tribunal concludes that there are two different interpretationsin the case law with regard to a prima facie case of discrimination based on family status: the onein Campbell River and the one in Hoyt. The Tribunal is of the opinion that the effect of theapproach in Campbell River is to impose a hierarchy of grounds of discrimination, some grounds,as the ground of family status, being deemed less important than others. This approach is notsupported by the purpose of the CHRA. Furthermore, all the permutations of the approach appliedto the ground of family status in British Columbia subsequent to the Campbell River decision,support the Tribunal’s conclusion that family status should not be singled out for a different andmore onerous or more stringent prima facie standard. The only solution is to apply the same testas for the other grounds enumerated in section 3 of the CHRA. This approach was accepted inHoyt and approved by the Federal Court in Johnstone.2010 CHRT 24 (CanLII)[167] I will therefore follow the approach in Hoyt which is consistent with human rightsprinciples in treating all prohibited grounds of discrimination as equal.[168] Furthermore, taking into account the special nature and status of human rights legislationas a quasi-constitutional legislation, the Tribunal concludes that the interpretation and applicationof family status proposed in Hoyt is the proper one to adopt. As stated earlier, human rightslegislation must be given a liberal and purposive interpretation, in which protected rights receive abroad interpretation, while exceptions and defenses are narrowly construed.