View cases - Stewart McKelvey

45discrimination set out in the CHRA under the guise of an expansion of the notion of “familystatus”.[164] In support of his arguments, Counsel referred to numerous cases and awards, including theBritish Columbia’s Court of Appeal decision in Campbell River which he suggested presented amore structured and pragmatic approach than the Tribunal’s decision in Hoyt. He also madereference to an arbitration award in Canadian Staff Union v. Canadian Union of PublicEmployees, (2006) 88 C.L.A.S. 212. In this case, the grievor had refused to relocate to Halifaxafter having applied for a job which indicated that the place of work would be Halifax. Thegrievor resided in St. John’s, Newfoundland, where he had shared custody of his children with hisformer spouse. He also was responsible for the care of his aging mother. The union argued thatthe notion of “family status” was not limited to the status of being a parent per se, but alsoextended to the accommodation of the grievor’s family responsibilities.2010 CHRT 22 (CanLII)[165] According to the award, the grievance raised important issues of human rights law whichwere summarized as follows: “ whether an employer’s designation of a specific geographiclocation in a job posting, and insistence that an employee who wished to hold that job live wherehe or she can report regularly to work at that location prima facie constitutes discrimination on thebasis of marital status or family status, if the employee’s marital and family responsibilitieseffectively preclude him or her from living where he or she can report regularly to work at thespecified location.” (at para. 6.)[166] The arbitrator dismissed the grievance on the ground that “for the purposes of any statuterelevant here, and the Collective Agreement, it was the Grievor’s choice, not his marital andfamily responsibilities, that precluded him from moving to Halifax.” (at para. 9.) The arbitratoradded: “what the Employer did here did not constitute prima facie discrimination on the basis ofmarital status or family status and the Employer was not required by law to accommodate theGrievor to the point of undue hardship.”[167] In his analysis of the relevant cases, the arbitrator adopted the narrower approach ofCampbell River in regards to the interpretation of “family status”. Although interesting, the