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45[159] The arbitrator dismissed the grievance on the ground that “for the purposes of any statuterelevant here, and the Collective Agreement, it was the Grievor’s choice, not his marital andfamily responsibilities, that precluded him from moving to Halifax.” (at para. 9.) The arbitratoradded: “what the Employer did here did not constitute prima facie discrimination on the basis ofmarital status or family status and the Employer was not required by law to accommodate theGrievor to the point of undue hardship.”[160] In his analysis of the relevant cases, the arbitrator adopted the narrower approach ofCampbell River in regards to the interpretation of “family status”. Although interesting, theTribunal notes that the facts relevant to this award are in many regards different from those in thepresent case. In that case, the grievor had applied for a job, knowing full well that the jobdescription indicated that it was to be located in Halifax. The grievor had a choice, he coulddecline to go to Halifax and remain in his position in St. John’s, which is not the case for theComplainant whose choice was either to report to Vancouver for an undetermined amount of timeor see her employment relationship terminated. The facts also indicate that there was nosignificant increase in pay or benefits involved between the job in Halifax and the one in St.John’s and that the grievor had applied for the job posted because he wanted a change and newchallenges (para. 15). The Tribunal also notes that the grievor’s children were 19 years old,starting university, and 15, starting high school, and, as indicated by the arbitrator, although thegrievor’s sons undoubtedly benefited greatly from his regular presence in St. John’s, theyrequired no special care from him, and he could make arrangement for their maintenance in hisabsence. (Para. 141.)2010 CHRT 24 (CanLII)[161] CN counsel also made reference to the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal’s decision inWight v. Ontario (No 2), 33 C.H.R.R. D/191, which dealt with an employee who, at the expiry ofher maternity leave, refused to return to work claiming that she was unable to make appropriatedaycare arrangements. Her employment was thereafter terminated on the ground that she hadabandoned her position. In this case the Tribunal found that the Complainant had “steadfastly”refused to acknowledge her employer’s reasonable expectations that she would take whateversteps are necessary to return to work when her maternity leave would expire. In the Tribunalwords: “She had decided she was going to be on a maternity leave until October at the earliest or