View cases - Stewart McKelvey

- 57 -meaningful sense be taken to have freely given up her right to choose whereto live. In civilian parlance, her acquiescence in signing the residencedeclaration was (as Baudouin J.A. found in the course of his public orderanalysis) tantamount to accepting a contract of adhesion and, as such, itcannot properly be understood to constitute waiver.Because Ms. Godbout had no opportunity to negotiate the mandatory residencestipulation, the Court held that she could not be taken to have freely given up her rightto choose where to live.2004 SCC 47 (CanLII)98 Under the circumstances of the instant case, the appellants had no choice butto sign the declaration of co-ownership in order to live at the Sanctuaire. They had nomore choice than Ms. Godbout did. It would be both insensitive and morally repugnantto intimate that the appellants simply move elsewhere if they took issue with a clauserestricting their rights to freedom of religion. However, this attitude is explicitlyreflected in what Morin J.A. proposed the appellants do at paras. 69-70:[TRANSLATION] I believe the appellants will have to sacrifice their right tolive in Place Northcrest if they cannot comply with the restrictions set outin the co-ownership agreement they freely signed.. . . However, in the case at bar, the appellants could easily choose to livesomeplace other than Place Northcrest if they refuse to make anyconcessions whatsoever in terms of how they practise their religious beliefs.In my view, since the appellants did not have a real choice, it would be incorrect toconclude that they voluntarily and validly waived their rights to religious freedom.99 Further, in this case, there is no evidence whatsoever that the appellants wereaware that signing the declaration of co-ownership amounted to a waiver of their rightsto freedom of religion. In fact, the respondent admits that the appellants [TRANSLATION]