View cases - Stewart McKelvey

time and because those people are likely to be less experienced in their relief positions than thecurrent pool of relief workers.[97] A more significant change is who bears the risk. Shutting down the equipment during amajor emergency gas leak rather than being able to evacuate the area is obviously very risky tothe person who must enter the gas-contaminated environment to do it. The proposedaccommodation would remove this risk from Mr. Pannu entirely and place it on the Utilitymanon his shift.[98] Thus, this case differs from Dhillon, where the increased risk of injury from not wearinga motorcycle helmet was borne entirely by the complainant. Similarly, in Bhinder v. C.N.R.,[1985] 2 S.C.R. 561, the increase in risk of not wearing a hard hat was also assumed by thecomplainant. Here, the proposed accommodation significantly reduces the risk to which Mr.Pannu will have to expose himself in a gas emergency compared to other Recaust Operators andplaces it entirely on the individual Utilityman on his shift. Those persons might be compensatedfor assuming that risk, either by being paid as a relief ARO for performing those duties duringthe shut down, and/or by increasing their pay generally. However, compensation does notaddress the fact that, if there are not enough volunteers, accommodating Mr. Pannu will meanthis risk is imposed on a Utilityman, changing his or her job duties as compared to other recaustUtilitymen.[99] In Renaud (at para. 20), Sopinka J. stated that, in assessing the effects of a proposedaccommodation on other employees,…more than minor inconvenience must be shown before the complainant’s rightto accommodation can be defeated. The employer must establish that actualinterference with the rights of other employees, which is not trivial butsubstantial, will result from the adoption of the accommodating measures. Minorinterference or inconvenience is the price to be paid for religious freedom in amulticultural society.In that case, the complainant required an accommodation of her religion that would permit her towork a special shift. The Court found that this accommodation might have required, “theadjustment of the schedule of some other employee but this might have been done with theconsent of the employee or employees affected.” The Court noted that the respondent employer25