View cases - Stewart McKelvey

32Employees, (2006) 88 C.L.A.S. 212. In this case, the grievor had refused to relocate to Halifaxafter having applied for a job which indicated that the place of work would be Halifax.The grievor resided in St. John’s, Newfoundland where he had shared custody of his children withhis former spouse. He also was responsible for the care of his aging mother. The union arguedthat the notion of “family status” was not limited to the status of being a parent per se, but alsoextended to the accommodation of the grievor’s family responsibilities.[112] The award stated that the grievance raised important issues of human rights law whichwere summarized as follows: “whether an employer’s designation of a specific geographiclocation in a job posting, and insistence that an employee who wished to hold that job live wherehe or she can report regularly to work at that location prima facie constitutes discrimination on thebasis of marital status or family status, if the employee’s marital and family responsibilitieseffectively preclude him or her from living where he or she can report regularly to work at thespecified location.” (at para. 6.)2010 CHRT 23 (CanLII)[113] The arbitrator dismissed the grievance on the ground that “for the purposes of any statuterelevant here, and the Collective Agreement, it was the Grievor’s choice, not his marital andfamily responsibilities, that precluded him from moving to Halifax.” (at para. 9.) The arbitratoradded: “what the Employer did here did not constitute prima facie discrimination on the basis ofmarital status or family status and the Employer was not required by law to accommodate theGrievor to the point of undue hardship.”[114] In his analysis of the relevant cases, the arbitrator adopted the narrower approach ofCampbell River in regards to the interpretation of “family status”. Although interesting, theTribunal notes that the facts relevant to this award are in many regards different from those in thepresent case. In that case, the grievor had applied for a job, knowing full well that the jobdescription indicated that it was to be located in Halifax. The grievor had a choice, he coulddecline to go to Halifax and remain in his position in St. John’s, which is not the case for theComplainant whose choice was either to report to Vancouver for an undetermined amount of timeor see her employment relationship terminated. The facts also indicate that there was nosignificant increase in pay or benefits involved between the job in Halifax and the one in