View cases - Stewart McKelvey

- 78 -142 Although any analysis of freedom of religion must include an inquiry intothe sincerity of the beliefs of those who assert it, such an inquiry must be as limited aspossible, since it will “expose an individual’s most personal and private beliefs to publicairing and testing in a judicial or quasi-judicial setting”: Edwards Books, supra, atp. 779.143 The sincerity of a belief is examined on a case-by-case basis and must be2004 SCC 47 (CanLII)supported by sufficient evidence, which comes mainly from the claimant. A method likethis was proposed by Professor Woehrling, supra, at p. 394:[TRANSLATION] . . . the sincerity of religious beliefs is a question of fact thatmust be assessed in accordance with the particular circumstances of eachcase, and the claimant’s personal credibility is of decisive importance, as hisor her testimony will always be the principal source of evidence.Although consistency in religious practice may be indicative of the sincerity of aclaimant’s beliefs, it is the claimant’s overall personal credibility and evidence of his orher current religious practices that matter. The essential test must be the claimant’sintention and serious desire to obey the fundamental precepts of his or her religion.Previous practice is but one among a number of means of demonstrating this intention.144 The approach I suggest gives a broad scope to the purpose of freedom ofreligion as guaranteed by s. 3 of the Quebec Charter. However, this is not to say that allconduct or practices will be protected so long as they are carried out in the name offreedom of religion. As I stated above, a claimant relying on conscientious objectionmust demonstrate (1) the existence of a religious precept, (2) a sincere belief that thepractice dependent on the precept is mandatory, and (3) the existence of a conflictbetween the practice and the rule.