View cases - Stewart McKelvey

44provision of appropriate care to their children. I am unable on these facts to find a"serious interference with a substantial parental or other family duty orobligation." (The underlining is mine.)[161] The BCHRT in Farlardeau was essentially following the reasoning formulated in theCampbell River case. But even if it had followed the Hoyt approach, its conclusion might not havebeen different. The main difference between the situation in Falardeau and in the present case isthat in Falardeau there had been no changes in Mr. Falardeau pattern of work or in his childcaredemands or arrangements. Furthermore, his employer had been made aware of Mr. Falardeau’schild-care needs and arrangements and it thought, rightly, that Falardeau was readily able toobtain coverage for his son's care if his work hours were extended. Therefore, Mr. Falardeau hadnot been able to make out a prima facie case on the ground of family status, as he had not proventhat he was unable to participate equally and fully in employment as a consequence of his dutiesand obligations as a parent.2010 CHRT 22 (CanLII)[162] In the present case, the Complainant by being forced to cover a shortage in Vancouver wasfacing a serious interference with her parental duties and obligations. The matter might have beendifferent had the Complainant refused to be set up at her home terminal.[163] In his closing arguments CN’s counsel argued that the Complainant’s position was basedon an incorrect premise. He qualified the complaint as a request that the employer accommodatethe Complainant’s “parental preferences and lifestyle choices.” He added that this position wasbased on an exceedingly broad interpretation of the CHRA and that the only characteristic raisedby the Complainant as triggering protection under the Act is the fact that she is a parent and assuch must see to the upbringing of her children. Counsel further submitted that requiring anemployee who is a parent to comply with his or her responsibility to report to work as required bythe collective agreement does not amount to discrimination prima facie. Rather, he argued thatthe refusal by an employee to comply with his or her responsibilities in this regard amounts to achoice which is exclusively personal in nature and which, absent exceptional circumstances, noemployer is obligated to accommodate. Accordingly, he concluded that upholding the complaintin this case would amount to adding “parental preferences” to the list of prohibited grounds of