View cases - Stewart McKelvey

- 68 -the building’s style and its aesthetic appearance of a luxury building, and also to ensurethe residents’ safety.123 With regard to the applicability of the Quebec Charter, Dalphond J. pointedout that the impugned provisions were found not in a statute, but in a contract that theappellants had freely signed when they purchased a co-owned property in PlaceNorthcrest. For this reason, he considered that only s. 13 of the Quebec Charter was2004 SCC 47 (CanLII)applicable. Since the constituting act of co-ownership was a “juridical act” within themeaning of s. 13, Dalphond J. stated that the issue was whether its provisions concerningthe use of balconies, patios and terraces were discriminatory within the meaning of s. 10of the Quebec Charter.124 Applying the three-step test from Québec (Procureur général) v. Lambert,[2002] R.J.Q. 599 (C.A.), he noted that, at first glance, the impugned provisions wereneutral in application, as they prohibited all residents from placing anything other thanordinary furniture on their balconies, porches or patios. In his view, the restrictions didnot affect the appellants any differently from other co-owners with religious beliefs, norwere they any more prejudicial to co-owners with religious beliefs than to those who didnot hold such beliefs. In short, Dalphond J. found that the impugned provisions were notdiscriminatory within the meaning of s. 10 of the Quebec Charter.125 Dalphond J. concluded that the trial judge had correctly stated the law infinding that the appellants were not under a religious obligation to set up succahs on theirbalconies, terraces or patios during Succot and that what was in issue was[TRANSLATION] “an act that they wished to carry out in 1996 and 1997 to discharge amoral obligation to celebrate Succot. This is a finding of fact made by the trial judge