A report by the International Hydrographic Organisation 12 indicates that 75 per cent ofNew Caledonia’s waters deeper than 200 metres have never been systematically surveyed.Similarly, 72 per cent of PNG’s waters shallower than 200 metres and 90 per cent of its watersdeeper than 200 metres have never been systematically surveyed. Many other nations inour region were unable to provide reliable or accurate data and a number of nations wereunable or unwilling to provide statistics. This is more an indicator of the lack of hydrographiccapability than one of security or other concerns. But it nonetheless presents us with somesignificant challenges and casts concern over the RAN’s ability to operate effectively throughoutour region.This shortfall is especially significant when considered in conjunction with <strong>Defence</strong>’s strategiccommitment to the development of an expanded amphibious capability, with the ability toproject power and undertake substantial regional assistance missions. Australia’s imminentacquisition of amphibious landing ships and air warfare destroyers, and later acquisition of12 submarines, further highlights this concern. As Australia develops the largest amphibiouscapability in our Navy’s history, and expects to operate in a region of limited hydrographicinformation, it is a timely reminder of our evolving role to support hydrographic capacitybuilding in the region.Marine science in Australia<strong>Defence</strong> does not need to achieve the <strong>Defence</strong> White Paper’s vision of information superiorityand spatial awareness in the undersea domain in isolation. The field of marine science isexpanding rapidly, particularly in Australia. The 2009 Federal budget announced the allocationof $387m to a ‘Marine and Climate Super-Science’ initiative. 13 The money will be used to acquirea state-of-the-art marine research vessel to replace RV Southern Surveyor; fund extensions tothe ‘Integrated Marine Observing System’ and new tropical marine infrastructure investmentsat the <strong>Australian</strong> Institute of Marine Science; and upgrade Australia’s climate change computingcapacity. These ocean-observing, -forecasting and -data management systems are vital forresearch but are also extremely useful for an ADF seeking to achieve information superiorityfor ASW.Recent reports, such as ASPI’s ‘Sea Change’ and OPSAG’s ‘A Marine Nation’, recommend amore coordinated approach to oceans policy and marine science. Navy’s Hydrographic andMETOC Branch, and DSTO—as members of OPSAG—fully support this drive, which willensure that the best use is made of marine science assets to achieve a truly national capability.One example of such cooperation is the BLUElink project 14 , a partnership between <strong>Defence</strong>,CSIRO and the Bureau of Meteorology. It has put in place an ocean analysis and forecastingsystem, at an overall investment of around $30m over the last six years. Each partner hascontributed around $10m, which has enabled the project to achieve much more than any oneagency could have done on its own.8
In a further example, the <strong>Australian</strong> Hydrographic Service is taking a leadership role,through the Intergovernmental Committee on Surveying and Mapping, to co-ordinate themanagement and sharing of coastal bathymetry data around Australia. This data will be usedfor coastal inundation modelling under extreme weather and climate change scenarios. But itis also highly valuable as a strategic asset for the RAN. However, there is still more progressthat must be made in cooperative arrangements like these. <strong>Defence</strong> should regard them asefficient mechanisms for establishing a robust and sustainable national infrastructure foroceanographic data, capable of meeting <strong>Defence</strong>’s requirements for information superiorityand hence supporting Navy’s mission ‘to fight and win in the maritime environment’. Suchinitiatives would also support our ambitions for more subtle ‘soft power’ options.Recent advances in oceanographyIn the last few years, operational oceanography has advanced rapidly. For example, the intenseEl Niño event of 1982/83 was the strongest on record at the time but—despite the havocit caused—it was not detected until nearly at its peak. 15 As a result, during the 1980s, anarray of 70 oceanographic moorings was installed in the tropical Pacific Ocean to measurethe temperature structure of the upper ocean, so the El Niño-Southern Oscillation could beconstantly monitored and warning given of future severe weather events.During the 1990s, further efforts were made by the international community to improveocean observations, 16 due largely to a growing appreciation of the influence of the oceans onthe global climate. This resulted in new ocean satellite missions, the deployment of furtheroceanographic moorings and the deployment of a global network of autonomous profilingfloats to measure temperature and salinity profiles and transmit the data via satellite to shoredata centres. 17 More recently, these oceanographic observations have started to be usedin ocean forecasting systems. 18 In 1997, the UK’s Meteorological Office implemented theworld’s first real-time, daily ocean forecasting system. The US Navy is also investing in oceanforecasting and there are similar systems in France, Italy and Norway.Australia’s ‘BLUElink’ ocean forecasting system was formally launched in 2007 and, sincethat time, has produced twice-weekly, 6-day forecasts of oceanic temperature, salinity,currents and sea surface height. 19 The first phase delivered a global ocean model, optimisedfor the <strong>Australian</strong> region, and a relocatable ocean-atmosphere model (ROAM), providinghigh resolution forecasts over areas of interest to <strong>Defence</strong>. During the second phase, theglobal ocean forecasting system is being improved and new capability delivered through theROAM model, including data assimilation. In addition, a ‘Littoral Ocean Modelling System’ isbeing developed to provide super-fine resolution of wave, swell and surf conditions in thelittoral environment, enabling better support to be provided to amphibious, submarine andmine warfare.9
- Page 3 and 4: Australian Defence ForceCONTENTSISS
- Page 5 and 6: asics of the ADF’s approach to wa
- Page 7 and 8: Oceanography and Force 2030: harnes
- Page 9: The warm, relatively fresh waters o
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- Page 15 and 16: Commodore Rod Nairn is a career hyd
- Page 17 and 18: Institute of Marine Science, $80m i
- Page 19 and 20: The nature of casualties presenting
- Page 21 and 22: Contracted solutions in less hostil
- Page 23 and 24: Planning implications of increased
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- Page 38 and 39: sources. In contrast, such trade be
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- Page 46 and 47: Lasers or Longbows? A Paradox of Mi
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This new capability provides techni
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‘Reaching back’ for information
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Figure 2. Chart summarising an exam
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Fast OR typically uses established
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the results produced. For example,
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of findings if very short time-scal
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Dr Tim McKay is Head of the DSTO Op
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strategic documents signed by the U
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• Strategic Command (STRATCOM), t
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Geographic Combatant Commands in th
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8. This evolution and expansion can
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27. In particular, in contrast to t
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Nevertheless, it can be argued that
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Proposed conceptThe proposed networ
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organisations could deploy at short
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The PacificHugh AmbroseText Publish
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Bloody Victory: the sacrifice on th
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Somme as critical to the forging of
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Command and Control: the sociotechn
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Human Factors Issues in Combat Iden
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The Canadian paper on CAS (Chapter
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The Ashgate Research Companion to M
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There is also a chapter on early vo
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The authors’ chief vulnerability
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Books of this genre are intended to
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The ninth chapter is entitled ‘To
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Many members of the ADF may honestl
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GUIDANCE FOR AUTHORSThe Australian