Proposed conceptThe proposed network seeks to capitalise on available technologies that can be ‘nested’with the requirements of the operational commander. The concept is not conclusive but isintended to promote further discussion and analysis. Accordingly, facets of the architectureor procedural aspects may not meet current <strong>Australian</strong> requirements. These should not beconsidered research errors but further issues that must be considered as part of the upgradingof the ADF’s communications and information systems.Figure 1 represents a coalition information system that has the potential to fill the currentcapability gaps. A network topology of this nature would specifically provide the capabilityto readily and securely exchange operational information and intelligence across a commonglobal network of national domains, in accordance with the use of contemporary networkdesign principles.Figure 1. Bilateral/Multilateral Common Coalition Information Systems Concept(© the author)In theory, the proposed approach—at least on a bilateral basis—would be relatively simpleto achieve, given the pending employment of the wideband global SATCOM (WGS) program.It will see the ADF draw on a global coverage payload of military-designated frequencies,with Australia expected to be allocated 10 per cent of the bandwidth and 15 per cent of thebeams across all satellites. 6 This will generate a capability increase comparable to the ADF’sfirst employment of satellite services. However, noting that the future operating environmentis likely to consist of a number of partner nations, it is suggested a more practical approachwould involve a capability across the coalition community, for which WGS may not be the mostsuitable satellite bearer or architecture.84
However, these and other key aspects are matters that would need to be decided by the partnernations, including a consensus on architecture, security practices, auditing and management.This system would see users responsible for their domain architecture, both domestically andinternationally. When deployed, each nation would be responsible for service provision to itsown forces but would be guaranteed coalition interoperability through network commonalityprinciples that support a derivative of the ‘plug and play’ concept. If designed correctly,interoperability with coalition partners via network commonality would be guaranteed.There are a range of immediate, positive aspects associated with a network topology ofthis nature. Specifically, users would experience a range of common applications, simplifiedaccess controls and a range of immediately interoperable tools. 7 And while technical staffand administrators would incur an increased training liability in the short term, a commonarchitecture concept would significantly reduce the overheads and reliance on coalitionnation support to rectify issues such as outages, account processing and general configurationmanagement during deployments.It is anticipated also that the proposed commonality of services would generate financial andmanagement savings in the long term across the ADF and other government agencies. A majoradvantage of network commonality is that hardware can be easily substituted without theneed to re-engineer network services. As the system at the bilateral level would primarily drawon the payload of the WGS constellation, considerable savings could be found both financiallyand through reduced reliance on current <strong>Australian</strong> bandwidth resources. Simple point-topointnetworks could be established without the need for satellite assets (noting geographiclimitations) or strategic ‘reach back’ to national servers and support agencies. This wouldreduce the reliance on and competition for scant <strong>Australian</strong> satellite-based resources, whichcould be reallocated to support domestic tasks or contingency operations.A summation of the key points driving this initiative is commonality, guaranteed interoperability,domain ownership and expedience of service. This would significantly strengthen the‘expeditionary’ capabilities of the ADF. For example, Australia’s commitment in Afghanistansees forces deployed in a number of geographically-dislocated locations. A network of thisnature would see the US, as lead nation in the region, responsible for the ‘trunking’ servicesthat would enable the proposed network. Ultimately, this service agreement could evolve tomirror the regional responsibilities of the partner nations.In theory, this coalition service provision could see Australia respond to regional threatsor disasters in accordance with extant planning and deployment guidelines. Should otherpartner nations dedicate assistance and troops, as occurred during the INTERFET deployment,they would simply deploy and interconnect with the established <strong>Australian</strong> bearer network.Alternatively, for geographically-dispersed operations within a theatre, Australia could act asthe lead/coordinating nation for satellite and network operations.The proposed model could also provide government agencies, such as Customs and the<strong>Australian</strong> Federal Police, with an immediately interoperable solution to deploy domesticallyand globally. Noting that the ADF would likely retain its ‘subject matter expert’ role, thecommonality on which the network would be built would ensure personnel from these85
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Australian Defence ForceCONTENTSISS
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asics of the ADF’s approach to wa
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Oceanography and Force 2030: harnes
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The warm, relatively fresh waters o
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In a further example, the Australia
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Direct threats include maritime ter
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Commodore Rod Nairn is a career hyd
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Institute of Marine Science, $80m i
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The nature of casualties presenting
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Contracted solutions in less hostil
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Planning implications of increased
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When a nation is at war, it is acce
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NOTES1. Doug Brooks, ‘Role of pri
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the further from Stanley the landin
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20. Comisión de Análisis y Evalua
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