The three partners have recently agreed to a third phase, starting in <strong>Jul</strong>y <strong>2010</strong>, in which theglobal model will be substantially improved and a range of new capabilities developed. Theseinclude a coupled ocean-atmosphere model, initially located over the exercise areas off easternAustralia, which will be able to model the upper layers of the ocean, the lower layers of theatmosphere and how they interact with each other. By modelling these complex interactions,ducts in the ocean and atmosphere will be able to be predicted, enabling their effects onsonar and radar propagation to be determined. This will be of crucial importance as newundersea warfare capabilities and the Air Warfare Destroyers are brought into service. Thethird phase of BLUElink will also enable new observational data sets to be incorporated intothe forecasting system to take full advantage of the increasing volume of ocean observationsavailable around the world.Now that global and basin-scale ocean forecasting models are established in a number oforganisations around the world, there is a trend towards downscaling the models to bringthem onto the continental shelf and hence resolve coastal and littoral scale processes. Thesecoastal waters are of particular interest, because they are where human activities have thegreatest impact and where some of the greatest societal benefits can be derived. A growinginterest can therefore be expected in coastal processes, including biological, geological andchemical processes, as well as environmental impact studies and research to support fishingand aquaculture, offshore engineering and the oil and gas sector. This ties in nicely withthe RAN’s interest in littoral environments, with the sub-surface and sea bed environmentsproviding the greatest challenges.The wider strategic policy landscapeThe <strong>Defence</strong> White Paper sets out a clear vision for improving Australia’s ‘hard’ maritimepower. Maritime power should be viewed more broadly, however, as the ability to use thesea to promote our national interests and become a regional leader in oceans managementand maritime security. Australia’s interests in the ocean are extensive and varied, and may bebroadly categorised as strategic, political, economic and environmental. We should take everyopportunity to explore new economic opportunities in the oceans, including renewable energy,desalination, deep seabed mining, carbon capture and storage and marine biotechnology.The ‘Sea Change’ report also proposes the establishment of an ‘<strong>Australian</strong> National OceansObservatory’, which would provide data to researchers, industry and the public, and promoteawareness of ocean resources.In order to appreciate the need for ‘soft power’ in the oceans, both the direct and indirectthreats must be considered. The direct threats are currently receiving attention, because theyare more obvious and shorter term, but there are also indirect threats which tend to be longerterm and consequently given lower priority. The potential consequences of the indirect threatsare nevertheless very serious and need more policy focus and international cooperation, aswell as good marine scientific research.10
Direct threats include maritime terrorism, illegal activity at sea (such as piracy) and illegal,unregulated and unreported fishing. Indirect threats include food and energy insecurity,climate change, loss of marine biodiversity, marine pollution, ocean acidification and marinenatural hazards. The <strong>Australian</strong> region—and particularly the Indian Ocean—is very vulnerableto marine natural hazards, including cyclones, tsunamis, severe weather and floods. Threatssuch as these can be alleviated with better marine scientific research. Australia shouldtake a leading role in promoting regional cooperation to deal with these indirect threats,harmonising our approach with international strategic programs. This would potentially bringus very significant strategic and political benefits.One example of Australia’s under-investment in marine research is provided by ourblue-water marine scientific research ship capability, which consists of just one vessel,RV Southern Surveyor. Even though the Government has committed, in the last budget, toreplacing the ship, Australia still compares unfavourably with countries like India (6 ships),Canada (18 ships) and Japan (more than 60 ships), even though all of these nations have smallerareas of maritime jurisdiction. 20Also, our understanding of the effects of El Niño on the Indian Ocean is rudimentary. But ifwe understood such mechanisms better, it would vastly improve opportunities for agriculture,weather prediction and natural disaster risk mitigation. The Indian Ocean ‘dipole’ has recentlybeen recognised as a coupled ocean-atmosphere phenomenon across the Indian Ocean basin.It is characterised by sea surface temperature anomalies, associated with shifting patternsof atmospheric convection, which can bring heavy rain or drought to East Africa, Indonesiaand Australia. 21 A thorough understanding of the dynamics of the Indian Ocean would helpto improve our ability to predict the Indian Ocean dipole and hence anticipate and mitigateits impacts.The five conclusions of the ‘Sea Change’ report are: first, Australia should do more topromote itself as a confident regional maritime power. We’re moving to increase our ‘hard’maritime power but we should be doing more to demonstrate our ‘soft’ maritime power andpresent ourselves as a ‘smart’ maritime nation; second, we need to develop a higher level ofunderstanding and awareness of the oceans, including by increasing our efforts in marinescience and technology; third, we should adopt a more coordinated approach to oceansmanagement and maritime affairs; fourth, we need to work more actively with our neighboursto promote a stable regional environment that addresses shared maritime concerns and willprevent the emergence of threats to Australia’s future prosperity and security; and finally,we need to develop our national capacity for managing and protecting the oceans and ournational interests, including by establishing an ‘Office of Oceans and Maritime Affairs’ in theDepartment of Prime Minister and Cabinet.11
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- Page 5 and 6: asics of the ADF’s approach to wa
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- Page 9 and 10: The warm, relatively fresh waters o
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- Page 15 and 16: Commodore Rod Nairn is a career hyd
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‘Reaching back’ for information
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Figure 2. Chart summarising an exam
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Fast OR typically uses established
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the results produced. For example,
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of findings if very short time-scal
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Dr Tim McKay is Head of the DSTO Op
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strategic documents signed by the U
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• Strategic Command (STRATCOM), t
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Geographic Combatant Commands in th
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8. This evolution and expansion can
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27. In particular, in contrast to t
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Nevertheless, it can be argued that
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Proposed conceptThe proposed networ
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organisations could deploy at short
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The PacificHugh AmbroseText Publish
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Bloody Victory: the sacrifice on th
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Somme as critical to the forging of
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Command and Control: the sociotechn
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Human Factors Issues in Combat Iden
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The Canadian paper on CAS (Chapter
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The Ashgate Research Companion to M
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There is also a chapter on early vo
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The authors’ chief vulnerability
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Books of this genre are intended to
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The ninth chapter is entitled ‘To
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Many members of the ADF may honestl
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GUIDANCE FOR AUTHORSThe Australian