Some <strong>Australian</strong>s may be disappointed that Kokoda is not mentioned but this is perhapsunderstandable when one considers the American viewpoint of what actions were (and werenot) important to the outcome of the war. Even though no small group of individual experiencescan hope to comprehensively cover all campaigns and decisive actions of the Pacific War, thefive cast members selected for the book do provide a vast array of experiences and emotions.<strong>Australian</strong>s may feel a little uneasy about what at times is excessive American patriotism. Butthe reader is purposely exposed to the views and impressions of the original participants andthe point is that this is exactly how they felt. Yes, racism against the Japanese was commonplace,murder of prisoners of war did occur and some <strong>Australian</strong> women were thought of as partof the ‘rest and recreation’. This raises the question of authenticity because The Pacific isvery much a story of what individuals believed was happening and what they rememberedafterwards. They were emotional times, some memories may be false and sometimes thingsnever actually happened the way one thinks it did.Overall, The Pacific is an interesting and rewarding read for someone who wants to beimmersed in the period. Unfortunately, it is a little too long for the average reader and a littletoo blasé for the specialist. It feels rushed and could have been improved by some further factchecking and editing: ‘The shit had hit the fan’ should only have been used once or twice foremphasis. Overall, it is the cast who make The Pacific a worthwhile read.War in the Pacific is likewise marketed as a tie-in with the miniseries, although the actualconnection appears to be limited to the foreword written by HBO’s senior military advisor,Captain Dale Dye, USMC (Retd). In some ways, this boxed set provides the general overviewmissing from The Pacific. Nevertheless, despite being authored by well respected Britishhistorian Richard Overy, this is in no way an academic tome. Instead it is designed to appeal tothe mass market and bring ‘the era and the events to life’ to a generation now almost 70 yearsremoved from the experience.Extending over some 40 heavily-illustrated pages, the main text is divided into concise doublepage‘chapters’ that cover the Pacific theatre’s major milestones. Interspersed throughout areyearly ‘operations maps’ that chart the broad movements of the forces involved and collectionsof removable facsimile documents. The latter range from individual radio messages sent by theMarines at Tarawa, ‘We need help—situation bad’, through to action reports, a March 1945issue of ‘Yank’ magazine and the signed Japanese instrument of surrender. Other featuresinclude a timeline on each page, photographs of common equipment and badges, and regularbiographical ‘cards’ introducing the key personalities on both sides.The boxed collection has evidently become an established means of packaging popular militaryhistory. Richard Overy has completed at least two similar sets for the Imperial War Museumand another has recently been produced on The Anzacs at War, written by Peter Pedersen. Solong as the reader accepts the limitations of the format, and in particular the lack of depth inthe text, then these collections can be viewed as a useful introduction to the topic and a clevermeans of raising awareness among those unfamiliar with the events described. The War in thePacific ticks all the key points and admirably fulfils its objectives.90
Bloody Victory: the sacrifice on the Somme and themaking of the twentieth centuryWilliam PhilpottLondon: Little, Brown and Company, 2009ISBN: 978-1-408702-246Reviewed by Colonel Darren Kerr, <strong>Australian</strong> ArmyWe were very surprised to see them walking …. The officers were in front. I noticed one of themwalking calmly, carrying a stick. When we started firing … they went down in their hundreds. Youdidn’t have to aim, we just fired into them.German infantryman, First Battle of the Somme, 1916 1Was Field Marshall Sir Douglas Haig, the British commander-in-chief who presided over theslaughter on the Somme, an unimaginative and dull officer who unnecessarily sent a generationto their deaths? Or did he understand that only ‘attritional’ warfare could wear down andultimately defeat the German war machine? Nearly 100 years after the battle of the Somme,there is still historical interest in this question.It must be said, though, that the weight of opinion among historians would tend to favour theformer proposition over the latter. It is difficult to defend a commander who presided over anattack in which 60,000 British troops were killed on one day; a day described by the historianHugh L’Etang as… probably the biggest disaster to British arms since Hastings. Certainly never before, nor since,had such wanton, pointless carnage been seen, not even at Verdun, where in the worst month ofall [June], the total French casualty list barely exceeded what Britain lost on her one day. 2In many ways, William Philpott’s 700-page book, Bloody Victory: the sacrifice on the Sommeand the making of the twentieth century, is both a reappraisal of the Somme and Haig himself.Philpott’s central thesis is contained in the title—that the Somme was a ‘bloody victory’ andit is time that people, particularly his British (and by implication <strong>Australian</strong>) audience, saw itthat way. For Philpott, the Somme marked not only the inevitable defeat of Germany in theFirst World War but also resonated throughout the 20th century as an epoch-shaping event.Not surprisingly, given this intent, those reading Bloody Victory for a tactical account or anexamination of what individual soldiers went through during the campaign will be disappointed.Philpott is a ‘big picture’ historian and his intent is not to get into the trenches with the menin those fateful months (much like Haig, who studiously avoided the front lines). This is not tosay that Philpott does not discuss the various offensives or that he does not assess the impactof the technology of war in 1916 on the British and French attacks but rather that his intent isto paint a broader canvas.91
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Australian Defence ForceCONTENTSISS
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Oceanography and Force 2030: harnes
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