ISSUE 182 : Jul/Aug - 2010 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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Geographic Combatant Commands in the broader context ofUS foreign relationsIn developing their theatre security cooperation plans and activities, the GCCs must remaincognisant of the role that US military power plays within the broader context of US foreignpolicy. With this in mind, the UCP requires the geographic combatant commanders to coordinatetheir efforts with the heads of the US diplomatic missions in the countries within their AOR.The sheer size of the six GCC AORs, however, means that this coordination requirement canbe daunting. For example, PACOM’s AOR includes 42 foreign countries, of which 36 have a USdiplomatic mission or ambassador. AFRICOM’s AOR, while covering a geographically smallerarea, includes 53 foreign countries.The GCC’s task to coordinate their actions with the respective diplomatic missions iscomplicated by the fact that their AORs do not necessarily align with the geographic regionsby which the US State Department and National Security Council are organised. 26 Thesedifferent geographic boundaries and resultant organisational structures present the GCCs withsignificant challenges. 27 For ADF members having to work with and in these large and complexorganisations, it is important to appreciate these organisational differences. The ADF has hadseveral officers working in HQ PACOM and HQ CENTCOM for several years and has recentlyplaced a two-star officer in an operations billet in HQ CENTCOM.The difficulty in coordinating regional efforts between the State Department and GCCs iscomplicated even further by the myriad of other US government ‘players’, from the more than30 agencies that operate in overseas countries. US diplomatic missions host these agenciesbut the degree of coordination largely depends on the informal relationships developed withinthe country team. Even within the DoD, there is scope for friction and the need for significantcoordination. For instance, almost all US diplomatic missions have a defence attaché whois responsible not to the GCC but to the Defense Intelligence Agency. While a good degreeof informal liaison and coordination typically occurs between the defence attaché and therelevant GCC, their relationship is not formalised and the defence attaché is not able torepresent the geographic combatant commander within the US diplomatic mission. 28 For ADFmembers required to interact with GCCs and US defence attachés, this distinction is importantto understand.In light of the concerns that emerge from such complicated arrangements, some commentatorsargue that the US DoD organisational structure is better placed to work transnational andmultilateral security issues, and that GCCs should become regional multi-agency commands. 29Indeed, the composition of HQ AFRICOM seems to reflect a more expansive multi-agencyapproach. 30 Notwithstanding these challenges in managing inter-agency relations, the UCP andGCC structure is likely to remain a feature of the US DoD organisational landscape for sometime. For ADF members, an understanding of these issues is crucial in order to work effectivelywith our American allies in a multi-agency and multiple stakeholder environment.76
ConclusionThe UCP has been the document through which US Presidents have arrayed and commandedUS military forces around the globe for over 60 years. It defines the organisational ‘ways’ thatthe US DoD seeks to achieve US national strategic ‘ends’. It is important for ADF membersworking with the combatant commands to understand how these headquarters came intobeing, what their mandate is and how they relate to other parts of the US Government. Therecent shift in both US and Australian foreign policy towards greater engagement with Africa,coupled with the establishment of AFRICOM, highlights the imperative for ADF members tomaintain an awareness of how the combatant commands contribute to advancing US interestsand how the ADF, working in concert, might contribute to advancing Australia’s interests.Colonel Marcus Fielding recently returned from serving as an action officer in the combined jointoperations directorate (CJ3) of Headquarters Multi-National Force-Iraq. He has held a variety ofcommand, staff and instructional appointments. He has also served on operations in Pakistan,Afghanistan, Haiti and East Timor. He has spent a total of four years on two exchange assignmentswith the US Army. He is a graduate of RMC Duntroon and the Australian Army Command and StaffCollege, and is presently undertaking the Defence and Strategic Studies Course at the Centre forDefence and Strategic Studies at Weston Creek.NOTES1. This article is an updated version of an earlier paper, ‘The United States Unified Command Plan’,published in The Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 7, No. 3, Autumn 2006.2. President Bush and Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced the creation of US Africa Commandon 6 February 2007. Africa Command was established in October 2007 and operated under USEuropean Command during its first year. See accessed 3 October 2008.3. Some other commentators believe the policy is motivated by the Rudd Government seeking tosecure votes for a seat as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council.4. The Governor General visited Mauritius, Namibia, Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique, Ethiopia,Kenya, Tanzania and the Seychelles in back-to-back State and official visits. The visits emphasisedAustralia’s growing engagement with Africa and its significant contribution to combating problemssuch as HIV/AIDS, mother-to-child disease transmission, orphaned and destitute children, andmaternal health. See accessed 16 March 2009.5. The first iteration of the UCP was titled the ‘Outline Command Plan’.6. A unified combatant command is a military command which has broad, continuing missions and iscomposed of forces from two or more military departments.7. The commands were European Command, Pacific Command, Far East Command, Atlantic Command,Caribbean Command, Alaskan Command and Northeast Command. See Ronald H. Cole, WalterS. Poole, James F. Schnabel, Robert J. Watson and Willard J. Webb, The History of the UnifiedCommand Plan 1946-1993, Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff, 1995, pp. 11-3.77
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Australian Defence ForceCONTENTSISS
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asics of the ADF’s approach to wa
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Oceanography and Force 2030: harnes
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Commodore Rod Nairn is a career hyd
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The nature of casualties presenting
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