ISSUE 182 : Jul/Aug - 2010 - Australian Defence Force Journal

The Effects of Space, Time and Force onOperational Planning in the Falklands WarRobert S. Bolia, Office of Naval Research Global, JapanOperational planners need to consider the factors of space, force and time in planningany military operation. The Falklands War was no exception. Despite taking place within arelatively small terrestrial theatre, with less than an infantry division deployed on each side,the conflict involved complex joint operations executed by naval, air and ground forcesacross thousands of square kilometres of the South Atlantic. It is the fact that this occurredwithin a comparatively short time and with so few forces that make it an excellent case study.This article, incorporating little-known Argentinean sources, will endeavour to analyse howthe three operational factors were—or should have been—taken into account by operationalplanners on both sides.At first glance, the Argentines must have believed that space, at least, was on their side.The islands they called the Islas Malvinas were 6034 kms from the nearest British possession,Ascension Island; the UK itself was another 6798 kms beyond that. 1 The Royal Air Force (RAF)had no aircraft that could realistically attack the islands, which meant that Argentina had atleast a month to garrison and provision the islands before a British task force would reach theSouth Atlantic. 2On the other hand, Argentina had air bases at Rio Gallegos and Rio Grande, both less than700 kms from the islands, meaning that any British landing could be opposed by Miragesand Skyhawks of the Fuerza Aérea Argentina (FAA) and Skyhawks and Super Étendards ofthe Armada de la República Argentina (ARA). 3 This view failed to account for the fact thatthe carrier-based Sea Harriers of the Royal Navy (RN) Fleet Air Arm would be significantlynearer to the islands than the FAA or ARA assets, leaving the latter—at the very edge of theiroperational range—too short of fuel to seriously vie for air superiority.Space was also a consideration for the British operational planners. The mission of the taskforce was essentially spatial, ‘to repossess the Falkland Islands as quickly as possible’. 4 Inorder to accomplish this, they needed to control the sea lines of communication betweenAscension and the islands, as well as the seas around the islands. The latter was facilitatedby the declaration on 12 April 1982 of a 200-mile Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) centredon the Falklands, designed to ensure the safety of the British fleet but also to compel theArgentineans to reinforce their positions by the much less efficient air route. 5In addition to gaining and maintaining control of the seas, the British also had to plan foran amphibious landing and subsequent ground campaign, which could not be regardedas independent events. The objective was the recapture of the islands, which meant thedestruction or capture of the Argentine garrison, most of which was located at Stanley. It wasnot feasible to land at Stanley itself, since it would be too well-defended. At the same time,26