The paradox of military technology states that while increased complexity in a military forceresults in increased capability, it also increases the likelihood that the capability will beunavailable for use because of the collapse of the complex supply chain required to maintainthe capability. The implication is that complex military technologies might not be the bestacquisition strategy for defence forces in the future.CapabilityA potentialfuture trend?Unplanned, chaoticcapability reductionHistoricalTrendComplexityFigure 1. The paradox of military technologyThe historical trend shows that over time both complexity and capability have increased. Thistrend creates a paradox of military technology. Left unmitigated, it is likely to result in anunplanned, chaotic capability reduction. The potential future trend suggests that defence forcesshould focus capability acquisition on accepting reduced capability but significantly reducedcomplexity to ensure they are still capable of achieving their missions.An example of an unplanned, chaotic capability reduction would be the financial collapse ofa company that manufactures proprietary parts for a piece of equipment. When the companycollapses, the ability to source parts will stop. The equipment may remain operational for aperiod of time based on extant repair part holdings. But there will come a point where theequipment fleet, or parts thereof, will become unserviceable for a lack of spare parts. This maybe a short- or long-term issue, depending on the nature of the equipment and the ability ofother companies to manufacture the part. Regardless of the timeframe, such a problem willnegatively impact military capability and the ability to conduct successful military operations.This paradox is not without historical precedent. For example, during the early years ofWorld War 2, the Wehrmacht re-roled a number of motorised infantry divisions to lightinfantry because the vehicle fleets could not be maintained. A more contemporary example isprovided by the GPS satellite constellation. According to the US Government AccountabilityOffice, there is a risk that current levels of GPS satellite service may not be maintained as50
older satellites reach the end of their operational life quicker than they are replaced. 31 Asthe transition to ‘scarcity industrialism’ progresses, it is likely that instances such as this willbecome more common. Responding to this paradox provides the ADF with an unprecedentedchallenge and one that must be addressed.Responding to the paradox of military technologyBased on the analysis in this paper, it is assessed that the centre of gravity or the source ofstrength for modern militaries is the industrial support base. Without it, a modern militarycould not function. There are a number of critical vulnerabilities that are likely to underminethis centre of gravity in coming decades. These critical vulnerabilities include disruption toglobal distribution chains, business and/or industry failures, changes to government policy(both <strong>Australian</strong> and internationally), budgetary pressures, the availability of raw materials andenergy, and geopolitical upheavals.The majority of these critical vulnerabilities are outside of the control of the ADF and, indeed,outside the control of national governments. This suggests militaries require a two-prongedapproach. The first is those actions the ADF can accomplish within its own resources and thesecond is influencing the national strategic level. Because the responses are in many waysinterlinked, they will be considered together.What can be done?Understanding the complex nature of supply chains and the associated vulnerabilities that theADF faces due to its reliance on these supply chains, provides a starting point for developingmitigation strategies. If complexity is defined by the number and depth of interactions, thenumber of products, the complexity of products, the number of institutions, and the numberof specialised roles and their knowledge base, and complexity is the source of the risks thatthreaten military capability, any response must focus on reducing the level of complexity.It will be difficult to reduce the level of complexity without significantly reducing the levelof capability within the ADF. However, the majority, if not all nations, will be subject to thepressures resulting from the transition to ‘scarcity industrialism’. Thus the absolute level ofmilitary capability is not important, rather it is the relative level of capability. As a result,defence forces who manage to reduce complexity levels are likely to develop significantadvantage over those militaries that continue to focus on ever more capable but also morecomplex capabilities.How can the ADF reduce its level of complexity? The first step is acknowledgement.Also, humans have a tendency to ‘silo’ problems, dealing with them in isolation. Unfortunately,this approach—analogous to focusing on one or two trees while ignoring the forest—is apervasive form of denial and inadequate to deal with the converging threats of the 21 st century.Once acknowledged, the next step is education. Without an understanding of the natureof complexity, it will be difficult to implement appropriate changes. The ADF’s equipment51
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There is also a chapter on early vo
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Books of this genre are intended to
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GUIDANCE FOR AUTHORSThe Australian