ISSUE 182 : Jul/Aug - 2010 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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organisational construct, the authors’ used observations of live-NCW scenarios. The resultspoint to the benefits of employing NCW-like constructs to cope with the adaptability of moderncombatants and the complexity of the battlespace in which they operate. The inclusion ofdetailed explanations of the experiments provides the reader with a better understanding ofhow NCW-like structures optimise human performance in complex environments. However, anunderstanding of the results is complicated by the authors’ reliance on quantitative analysis,which may be confusing to those without a grounding in quantitative methods.The authors’ use of quantitative methods is not limited to the derivation of experiment results.Using social network analysis, the authors expand on the ‘approach space’ conceptual modelfor command and control developed by NATO in 2007. The result, though heavy on equations,is a means by which different command and control structures can be accurately placed withinthe ‘approach space’, allowing them to be compared, examined and understood more easily.This is a valuable addition to the NATO SAS-050 model.The difficulty that would be faced by a reader without a background in statistical analysis isthe major shortcoming in this book. In writing a book that crosses disciplinary boundaries,the authors needed to ensure they met the needs of a diverse audience. Unfortunately, as theyacknowledged in the book’s conclusion, they did not get this balance quite right. Hence, somereaders may be inclined to glance over sections of the book that focus heavily on data analysisand, in doing so, miss some key insights. This is an unfortunate, though perhaps unavoidable,side-effect of the HFI focus of the book.Nevertheless, the book’s structure aids its readability. Each chapter builds on the previous tosupport the authors’ case for acknowledging the role of the human in the system. This requiresthat the reader has a relatively firm understanding of each chapter before proceeding to thenext, which is problematic for those put off by the quantitative methods sections. However,the authors’ use in each chapter of an ‘aims’ and ‘summary’ section provides a quick, althoughlimited, appreciation of each chapter’s contents. This is useful for a later revision of chaptersor to glance over some HFI-specific sections of the book.In writing this book, the authors set themselves the ambitious goal of using HFI research toidentify linkages between the various disciplines involved in NCW, then using those linkagesto build conceptual bridges that ‘reach out across various interdisciplinary boundaries’.This interdisciplinary approach, focused on understanding how the human operates in theNCW environment, offers a unique and valuable insight into modern command and controlarrangements. The book’s extensive and thorough review of literature relating to organisationaldesign will see many readers drawn out of their conceptual comfort-zone to alternative viewsthat will nonetheless enhance their understanding of command and control in the informationage.Although some readers may at times find the data analysis impenetrable, the uniqueinsights that this analysis provides makes the additional effort worthwhile.This book is a ‘must read’ for all involved or interested in the development and implementationof modern command and control systems.96
Human Factors Issues in Combat IdentificationD.H. Andrews, R.P Herz and M.B. Wolf (eds.)Ashgate: Farnham UK, <strong>2010</strong>ISBN: 978-0-7546-7767-3Reviewed by Dr Jeremy Manton, DSTOIn Operation DESERT STORM in 1991, the friendly fire casualty rate exceeded 20 per cent. TheUS Department of Defense requested its Defense Science Board look at possible causes andremedies. This book resulted from a US Air <strong>Force</strong> Research Laboratory-sponsored workshop in2008, where representatives from academia, government and industry presented their researchand experience on the topic of ‘combat identification’ (CID). The papers appear premised onfriendly fire incidents during the Iraq and Afghanistan force-on-force conflicts.This book is a timely benchmark text for human factors engineering and operations researchand is an excellent primer to all who study, design and procure complex military systems.It covers the analysis of joint fires from the systems design, integration and performanceof coalition and joint fires teams. The findings identify the key issues in operating highlycapabletechnologies in war. For the ADF, this book has chapters that are essential reading forpractitioners, researchers and those studying to be capability managers and procurers.Investment in human factors engineering and research appears a more difficult priority forthe military to set than technology and systems development. However, when sophisticatednetworked technologies are applied vigorously with little experience in the scenariosencountered, then the consequences can be tragic. This book brings to mind the previousCID catastrophe that spawned the significant work on ‘tactical decision making under stress’that followed the USS Vincennes’ shooting down of a civilian aircraft in the Strait of Hormuzin 1988.The 21 chapters are grouped into sections covering cognitive processes, visual discrimination,situation awareness (SA), teams and automation. In the introductory chapter, Wilson, Salasand Andrews expand on a taxonomy proposed by Wilson et al in 2007 of the causes offriendly fire incidents. 1 They argue that friendly fire incidents result when there is a failure ofshared cognition among team members. The causes cited are a breakdown in team, task andorganisation, along with technology-based factors. The central issue pursued is a breakdownin communications, coordination and cooperation. The rest of the chapter explores varioustraining and learning strategies, both formal and informal, that can be used to increase operatorexpertise and competency. Their message is clear: training using a scientific approach to skillacquisition and learning will reduce errors in CID.The conclusions reached by Hawley, Mears and Marcon in Chapter 19 will not be startlingto joint fires practitioners, systems analysts or operations researchers. Their conclusionsare based on an in-depth analysis of the Patriot air defence missile system and the incidentsinvolving the shooting down of a RAF Tornado and US Navy F/A-18 during Operation IRAQI97
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Australian Defence ForceCONTENTSISS
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Oceanography and Force 2030: harnes
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In a further example, the Australia
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Direct threats include maritime ter
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Commodore Rod Nairn is a career hyd
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The nature of casualties presenting
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Planning implications of increased
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When a nation is at war, it is acce
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