accounts for 93 per cent of the production of most rare earths but has reduced its exportsover the last three years and is considering further reducing exports for environmental andstrategic reasons. 18 These factors suggest the availability of some mineral resources requiredfor modern industrial societies will decline in the future.The final threat is debt deflation. Prime Minister Rudd has attributed the global financialcrisis to a ‘decade of excess,’ with the boom ‘created on a pile of debt held by consumers,corporations and some governments’. 19 Debt-to-GDP ratios in Australia, the US and manyother countries are now more than twice what they were during the Great Depression. Post-World War 2 recessions have all resulted in a declining debt-to-GDP ratio, while subsequentrecoveries have involved debt rising faster than income. It is becoming increasingly apparentthat ‘this is simply a formula for avoiding a crisis now by having a bigger one in the future’. 20The global financial crisis (GFC) can be viewed essentially as a balance sheet crisis. 21 That is,businesses and individuals are over-leveraged. This can be addressed in a number of ways.However, all have significant detrimental side effects. According to the World Bank, savingrates have increased significantly since the onset of the GFC, as individuals and businesseshave attempted to reduce their debt ratios. This has resulted in reduced demand for consumergoods and reduced investment. Another option involves defaulting on loans, which results infalling asset prices and toxic loans for financial institutions.A third option, attempted by many governments, is ‘quantitative easing’ or inflating the moneysupply to reduce the value of debt. However, this will be difficult to achieve because of the sheersize of the debt-to-GDP ratio and the impact of devaluing currencies. As an example, despiteunprecedented stimulus packages, US bank loans contracted at a 14 per cent annualised ratein the three months to <strong>Aug</strong>ust 2009. 22 These factors imply that the global economy will facea prolonged period of debt deflation or stagflation until the debt-to-GDP ratio is reduced tomore manageable levels. This will have significant impact on consumer spending, investment,economic growth and, of course, defence budgets.Most post-World War 2 recessions have been preceded by oil price spikes, including the GFC. 23As oil production declines, the price of oil will continue to be volatile, resulting in further oilprice spikes and recessionary pressures. This in turn will both reduce the availability of creditfor future investment 24 and the availability of mineral resources. Other threats, such as climatechange, water shortages and salinity, will also have significant impact on the global economy.In combintion, they are, or will be, ‘game changing’ events.Yet despite the warnings—particularly with regards to peak oil and the GFC—conventionalwisdom has been dismissive and little in the way of mitigation has been achieved. Canadianpolitical scientist Thomas Homer-Dixon argues that at a global level ‘we face an ever-greater riskof a synchronous failure … arising from simultaneous, interacting stresses acting powerfullyat multiple levels’. 25 John Michael Greer argues that the global economy is transitioning from‘abundance industrialism’, 26 defined by the abundance of energy and resources, to ‘scarcityindustrialism’. The implication is that it is unlikely that current levels of complexity can bemaintained. The only real question, according to Richard Heinberg, is ‘whether societies willcontract and simplify intelligently or in an uncontrolled chaotic fashion’. 2748
So how could a collapse to a lower level of complexity unfold? David Korowicz argues thereare two forms; ‘hub collapse’ and ‘creeping collapse’. 28 Hub collapse is where a key element ofthe global system fails, which has immediate and far reaching consequences throughout theentire system. The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 provides a recent examplewhich almost precipitated a global collapse in international trade and finance, only averted byunprecedented government stimulus.Creeping collapse is based on the failure of individual companies or elements within thesystem, which in turn results in other failures. While not having the same immediate impactas the failure of a hub, creeping collapse can over time have significant negative impacts. Forexample, declining economic activity will likely result in falling disposable income. In turn,this will have a negative impact on the tourism industry, with a flow-on impact on the aviationindustry, which will be forced to downsize. 29 This will have further negative impacts on otherindustries, such as aircraft manufacturers, travel agents, hotels and hire car companies.Economies of scale have been one of the advantages of the globalised economy, allowing goodsto be produced cheaper and enabling more to be purchased, while also freeing up disposableincome to purchase other goods. However, as creeping collapse progresses, businesses willface the prospect of ‘dis-economies’ of scale, where declining sales will result in price rises tocover costs, which will further reduce the number of customers who can afford the goods orservices. 30 Creeping collapse, while initially only affecting parts of the global economy, has thepotential to spread and significantly impact the whole. Arguably, it is the most likely methodby which the globalised economy could collapse to a lower level of complexity.The paradox of military technologyA Roman general, planning and conducting a battle had relatively few considerations to make.The battlefield was small enough in size that he could observe most of it; his capabilitiesconsisted of infantry, archers, chariots and cavalry, with some catapults. His communicationsconsisted of runners, liaison officers and perhaps a few signals, such as bugles or flamingarrows. The equipment of his army was simple; it required a relatively simple industrial baseand regional supply chains to support it. Much of the equipment used could be repaired bythe army, often from materials available in the immediate area. The relative complexity of aRoman legion was low.A military organisation today has a much more complex task. First, the number of capabilitiesis an order of magnitude greater than that of the Romans, with a vast array of capabilities.These capabilities allow operations to be conducted globally, in the air, on land, at sea, overthe electromagnetic spectrum and in space. The industrial base to support this is global innature, often involving thousands of companies and a complex supply chain. Comparinga modern military with the Romans clearly identifies that not only have the capabilities ofmilitaries increased but so have their complexity. In a prosperous world economy, this is not ofconcern. However, in a world economy at risk of synchronous failure, it gives rise to a paradoxof military technology.49
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GUIDANCE FOR AUTHORSThe Australian