ISSUE 182 : Jul/Aug - 2010 - Australian Defence Force Journal

Nevertheless, it can be argued that JP2090 is working to improve fixed infrastructure capabilitiesand has not adequately addressed the immediate interoperability needs of deployed forcesthrough a common coalition system. ‘Gateway’ development is effective but it is not theanswer to the information exchange limitations of the operational commander.Current national and coalition architecturesNational systems provide national services; this is fundamental and will not change. The keyaspect of network-centric coalition operations is interoperability through commonality. At thelower tactical levels, this is achieved through direct liaison and (somewhat) automated sensorfusion. At the strategic level, there is any number of methods to facilitate interoperabilityacross the tenets of national power. These are concerned with diplomacy, intelligence activities,military and economic cooperation, and engagement. What is missing is interoperability inthe operational space. In an effort to achieve interoperability, a number of coalition systemshave been developed, including the ISAF ‘mission secret’ network (IMS), the common SIPR 3domain (CSD) and CENTRIX in its multitude of releasable formats. What is lacking is networksimplicity, which could be achieved through a single common system.The CENTRIX network was ‘designed to one day form a single, common, global, multinationaldata network’. 4 However, it remains a loose collection of multiple, separate networks that cannotbe interconnected because the necessary security technology is not commonly employed byall nations. Further, the system is also limited by over-exposure and a lack of hardware andnetwork commonality. It is, therefore, considered unsuitable for further development as it willnot evolve suitably to meet the needs of the operational commander in accordance with thenetwork concept proposed in this article.The established coalition systems commonly deployed have varying levels of effectiveness.For example, they are employed by Australian forces in the Middle East area of operations asthe primary means of coalition interoperability. But, despite connectivity, there is no reliablemethod (architecturally or technically) to exchange data between these systems and Australiannational systems. The common practice is to ‘air gap’ the necessary data. This method hasinherent risk, as it contravenes information exchange principles and also relies on mass storagedevices to conduct the information exchange. This leads to an increased risk of computer virusinfection and may provide an easy target for clandestine intelligence collection.Additionally, accounts are often shared and passed between personnel because the processesassociated with ‘request’ and ‘creation’ vary significantly between systems. They are also oftencomplex and not timely. In some cases, the process to gain access to databases and accountsis measured in weeks and months, rather than days. Some stipulated aspects are difficult tomeet because Australian requirements are managed differently to the methods employed bycoalition partners. Recent experience has also highlighted further issues once members aregranted accounts. In particular, the gamut of applications and variations in standard operatingenvironments is problematic.82