years, it was often perceived—by an isolated and occasionally jittery population—as apotential mounting base for invasion forces. Later, during the Second World War, Nouméa’spotential as a staging base was first coveted by the Japanese and then exploited by the Allies,to such an extent that only San Francisco handled more tonnage by war’s end.Beyond the land itself, New Caledonia’s EEZ flanks those of Australia, Fiji, Vanuatu and theSolomon Islands, with the EEZs of New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and the Polynesian andMicronesian island countries nearby. New Caledonia therefore assumes a regional centralitythat makes it a logical staging base for all manner of trans-Pacific endeavours. This unchangingtrait strongly influenced France’s original decision to annex the territory in 1853 and remainsa key factor in the tripartite France-Australia-New Zealand (FRANZ) agreement for cooperativemaritime surveillance, disaster responses and humanitarian assistance in the Pacific.The 2009 Australia-France <strong>Defence</strong> Cooperation Agreement brings the bilateral relationship(and indeed rapprochement) to new levels, particularly by providing a legal framework forcombined activities. Regular activities, including the multilateral Exercise Croix du Sud, thecommand post Exercise Equateur and increasingly frequent real-life emergencies, demonstratethe importance and benefits of such a close and effective entente. At the global level too,France and Australia share views on issues such as counter-terrorism and international crime,as well as intervention and stabilisation actions in Afghanistan and elsewhere.While France retains a strategic presence in the Pacific, its relationship with the surroundingPacific island nations will undoubtedly continue as a valuable contributor to maritime securityand development assistance, and a willing agent of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.For as long as this endures, France and its likeminded partners of Australia, New Zealand andthe US can be expected to develop progressively closer cooperative arrangements. A putativefuture independent New Caledonia must consider the merits and viability of continuing such acollaborative partnership, both for its own interests and those of the region.Naturally, there is a corresponding French perspective to Australia’s consideration of NewCaledonia as a strategic waypoint for its involvement in and support to Pacific affairs. NewCaledonia gives France a means to project power and influence. But its remoteness fromEurope means it makes sense to work together with nearby countries to achieve mutualgoals—hence the remarks of France’s <strong>Defence</strong> Minister in 2008 that:France is in the process of restructuring its defence capabilities and we have decided thatNew Caledonia will become a major presence and major base in the Pacific. We decided to dothis because New Caledonia is close to Australia and for us this base in New Caledonia will be themeans through which we will grow our cooperation with Australia. 5New Caledonia’s isolation from its European patron is at once a liberation and a constraint forits inhabitants. Regardless of its political destiny, it is incontestable that New Caledonia is andwill remain a fundamental player in Pacific strategic affairs. Whether it remains part of France,is given greater autonomy or even granted independence, New Caledonia must—and is intrain to—develop and deepen ties with its Pacific neighbours and its Southeast Asian tradepartners. Attaining full membership of the Pacific Islands Forum and formal representationat peak bodies, such as the Melanesian Spearhead Group, provide New Caledonia with vitalopportunities to engage and foster mutual trust, confidence and understanding within the40
egion. New Caledonia’s ongoing active participation in organisations such as the Secretariatof the Pacific Community and the Forum Fisheries Agency also adds strategically significantcohesion to the Pacific hemisphere. In each of these, English is the dominant operatinglanguage, which is unlikely to diminish in an increasingly globalised and anglophonicPacific region.In knowledge and technology too, New Caledonia offers useful and beneficial programs for itsneighbouring countries, as much as for itself. The Nouméa-based Institut de Recherche pourle Développement and the University of New Caledonia exemplify France’s regional portals forhighly-skilled and well-resourced science, research and development programs. They and theircounterparts deserve greater integration into other Pacific endeavours. However, this requiresan equal effort from both New Caledonia and its neighbours to acknowledge and encouragethe mutual benefits of doing so.ConclusionNew Caledonia’s mineral resources will continue to remain important in an increasinglyindustrialised world economy. And its location astride important trade routes and ecologicalconduits provides a unique position of overwatch for the traffic that sustains the SouthPacific. Even so, the way in which New Caledonia engages with its neighbours and partnerswill continue to define the calibre of its influence in the region and beyond. This will be thecase whether New Caledonia remains part of France or becomes its own sovereign nation.Regardless of any other consequence, the last 160 years of European annexation has securedNew Caledonia a strategically significant legacy, both in natural and manmade resources, andin its strategic geography. Whichever path New Caledonia takes, its future role is certain toremain equally salient to its neighbourhood, including Australia and beyond.Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas Floyd graduated from RMC Duntroon in 1989 and has since servedin a variety of regimental, staff and policy appointments in Australia and on operations. He is aqualified French linguist and has visited New Caledonia on multiple occasions. He is currently theChief of Army Visiting Fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney. The articledraws on previous research from his Master of Letters thesis, titled ‘Coral Sea Neighbours’.41
- Page 3 and 4: Australian Defence ForceCONTENTSISS
- Page 5 and 6: asics of the ADF’s approach to wa
- Page 7 and 8: Oceanography and Force 2030: harnes
- Page 9 and 10: The warm, relatively fresh waters o
- Page 11 and 12: In a further example, the Australia
- Page 13 and 14: Direct threats include maritime ter
- Page 15 and 16: Commodore Rod Nairn is a career hyd
- Page 17 and 18: Institute of Marine Science, $80m i
- Page 19 and 20: The nature of casualties presenting
- Page 21 and 22: Contracted solutions in less hostil
- Page 23 and 24: Planning implications of increased
- Page 25 and 26: When a nation is at war, it is acce
- Page 27 and 28: NOTES1. Doug Brooks, ‘Role of pri
- Page 29 and 30: the further from Stanley the landin
- Page 34 and 35: 20. Comisión de Análisis y Evalua
- Page 36 and 37: Coral Sea neighbours - then and now
- Page 38 and 39: sources. In contrast, such trade be
- Page 40 and 41: New Caledonia’s significance toda
- Page 44 and 45: NOTES1. K. Mushakoji quoted in R. A
- Page 46 and 47: Lasers or Longbows? A Paradox of Mi
- Page 48 and 49: Military complexityAs military capa
- Page 50 and 51: accounts for 93 per cent of the pro
- Page 52 and 53: The paradox of military technology
- Page 54 and 55: fleet is massive, with sustainment
- Page 56 and 57: NOTES1. Benjamin Franklin, Poor Ric
- Page 58 and 59: 30. D. Korowicz, ‘Things Fall Apa
- Page 60 and 61: This new capability provides techni
- Page 62 and 63: ‘Reaching back’ for information
- Page 64 and 65: Figure 2. Chart summarising an exam
- Page 66 and 67: Fast OR typically uses established
- Page 68 and 69: the results produced. For example,
- Page 70 and 71: of findings if very short time-scal
- Page 72 and 73: Dr Tim McKay is Head of the DSTO Op
- Page 74 and 75: strategic documents signed by the U
- Page 76 and 77: • Strategic Command (STRATCOM), t
- Page 78 and 79: Geographic Combatant Commands in th
- Page 80 and 81: 8. This evolution and expansion can
- Page 82 and 83: 27. In particular, in contrast to t
- Page 84 and 85: Nevertheless, it can be argued that
- Page 86 and 87: Proposed conceptThe proposed networ
- Page 88 and 89: organisations could deploy at short
- Page 91 and 92: The PacificHugh AmbroseText Publish
- Page 93 and 94:
Bloody Victory: the sacrifice on th
- Page 95 and 96:
Somme as critical to the forging of
- Page 97 and 98:
Command and Control: the sociotechn
- Page 99 and 100:
Human Factors Issues in Combat Iden
- Page 101 and 102:
The Canadian paper on CAS (Chapter
- Page 103 and 104:
The Ashgate Research Companion to M
- Page 105 and 106:
There is also a chapter on early vo
- Page 107 and 108:
The authors’ chief vulnerability
- Page 109 and 110:
Books of this genre are intended to
- Page 111 and 112:
The ninth chapter is entitled ‘To
- Page 113 and 114:
Many members of the ADF may honestl
- Page 115:
GUIDANCE FOR AUTHORSThe Australian