ISSUE 182 : Jul/Aug - 2010 - Australian Defence Force Journal

to Hermes and/or Invincible would restrict the RN’s ability to operate in the vicinity of theFalklands. However, meteorological conditions prevented such an attack until 2 May, the verysame day the submarine HMS Conqueror sank the ARA cruiser General Belgrano, which wasenough to convince Argentine’s naval leadership that the only safe place for its fleet wasin port. 16In terms of air assets, neither side had much choice. The RAF would only be able to operatein the theatre of operations after a successful landing by 3 Commando Brigade and theconstruction of runways and an air defence system. Until then, the RN’s Fleet Air Arm,comprising two squadrons of Sea Harriers, would be the air component. The FAA had most ofits fighters at its disposal, based at locations within reach of the islands. 17 However, its fighterscould not compete with the combination of the Sea Harrier, Sidewinder missiles and superiorair-to-air training of RN pilots. 18 A further problem was that the FAA pilots were not trained inanti-ship warfare, which was the role in which they were most needed. The ARA had its ownplanes but, because the carrier Venticinco de Mayo remained in port, they operated from landbases. Also, their sorties were seldom coordinated with the FAA. In fact, neither side did a verygood job of integrating its air component into operational planning and, for most of the war,air operations were reactive rather than proactive.Time was perhaps the most decisive of the operational factors. The British recognised thisfrom the beginning—the decision to send a task force, consisting of both of the RN’s aircraftcarriers and a Royal Marine brigade was made even before the invasion occurred, on the basisof intelligence reports. And nuclear submarines had been dispatched to the South Atlanticeven before that. 19 The UK planners of OPERATION CORPORATE knew that a task force hastilyassembled was not the optimal solution. But they also knew that an immediate responsewould send a clear message to the Argentine junta. It was fine to give diplomacy a chance towork—whether via the UN or Haig’s shuttle diplomacy—but waiting to send the task forceuntil diplomacy had failed would have given Argentina that many more days to reinforce andprovision its occupying forces.The Argentine junta was not prepared for the British reaction. They failed to appreciate thatthe UK would fight for a territory 13,000 kms from London—and one that most Britons couldnot locate on a map—or that world opinion would not support their claim against that of an‘imperialist’ power. As a result, they failed to plan for an occupation force that could actuallydefend against a seaborne assault. 20 They attempted to use the interval before the arrival ofthe British task force to reinforce the islands but, by the time the orders were written, it wasalready too late. Moreover, while transport by sea was the only realistic means that Argentinahad of reinforcing the islands, that was too risky to continue indefinitely, not least becauseRN submarines were operating in the South Atlantic within two weeks of the invasion. 21Nevertheless, even after the commencement of hostilities, the military junta believed that timewas on its side. Misapplying the lessons of the American experience in Vietnam, it assessedthat the British public would not support a protracted conflict. The British economy was onthe decline and it was believed that voters would not support a war that cost not only livesbut also required the replacement of considerable lost materiel. The junta believed that it didnot need to win, only to hold the islands long enough for the conflict to become sufficientlyunpopular in Britain.28