sources. In contrast, such trade benefits were neither matched nor guaranteed by Britain orher Dominions. A French analyst at the time concluded:When Japan ... considers her interests at stake, whether or not she has previously been consulted,she will not hesitate to act and will do so—and this is to be feared—abiding by her treatiesor not. 3Japan clearly had options to ensure continued access to the minerals she required: maintainfriendly relations with New Caledonia or occupy the island. Either way, it is unclear to whatextent Australia was mindful of Japanese resources investment in New Caledonia at the time.Prior to the Second World War, Australia had supposedly demonstrated expansionist designson her Pacific neighbours—whether real or imagined—in her capture and annexation ofGerman territories during the Great War. New Caledonia and France feared substitution ofone colonial power for another. Yet, at the same time, Australia was regarded as a somehowkindred colonial entity. As war threatened to engulf the Pacific, Australia became increasinglyconscious of the strategic stepping-stones to its north. Australia could not risk New Caledoniabecoming a base for hostile forces. And as the entry of Japan into the war became ever morelikely, Nouméa assumed this would trigger an <strong>Australian</strong> occupation.New Caledonia’s ‘rallying’ to Free FranceThere is dispute as to whether Australia jumped or was pushed into her short-lived yetpivotal role in New Caledonia’s ‘ralliement’. Australia’s then Minister for External Affairs, SirJohn McEwen, asserts he battled against Cabinet inertia and indecision to pre-emptively actagainst Nouméa’s pro-Vichy government, particularly in light of Japan’s actions in Indo-China.However, according to John Lawrey (assistant to the <strong>Australian</strong> Government representative inNew Caledonia from December 1940 to 1943), the <strong>Australian</strong> Government was reluctant toact against an outpost of Vichy France, which by this stage was an implicit ally of Germanyand thus Japan. Regardless, Menzies’ Government was cognisant of Nouméa’s declaration forVichy. Furthermore, Canberra was certainly attuned to Britain’s calls to neutralise or redeemall French possessions on the Gaullist’s behalf.The Anglo-Free French plan envisaged the insertion, by naval vessel, of a suitable prodeGaulle official—Vila’s Free French governor, Henri Sautot—and deposition of the Vichyadministration in New Caledonia. However, because the <strong>Australian</strong> Naval Station was obligedto carry out British Admiralty directives in this area of the Pacific, a conflict of interest wasemerging. Indeed, it can be argued that Australia’s hesitation to act as an unquestioning agentprovocateur for Britain was the catalyst—and even the beginnings—of increasing divergencebetween British and <strong>Australian</strong> foreign policy and war aims.While it is likely that Australia eventually accepted the task because of pressure from Britain,Canberra had prudently directed HMAS Adelaide to Vila beforehand, ostensibly to search forthe German raider Orion. Adelaide was the only ship in the area capable of outgunning theVichy French sloop Dumont d’Urville which, since 23 <strong>Aug</strong>ust, had been at anchor in Nouméa36
harbour, providing moral and implicit military support to the Vichy administration’s shakyauthority. Eventually, on 21 September 1940, the Gaullists consolidated their position andSautot was delivered by HMAS Adelaide. Local reaction to his arrival was euphoric. However,Australia’s role was largely overshadowed by the ralliement itself and general relief on all sidesthat it had been bloodless.Post-ralliement legacyBy 17 April 1941, Australia had conducted a provisional assessment of New Caledonia’sdefence requirements and in December inserted an independent rifle company to continuereconnaissance and train the locals. Even so, actions towards improving defences were slow,despite the assessment having recommended immediate construction of three air bases andthe development of other infrastructure.Australia was keen for direct liaison between the new Free French administration and theMenzies Government. However, de Gaulle refused to sanction such an arrangement—throughfear of losing control of the colony—and, as a foretaste of future behaviour, insisted that alldecisions affecting New Caledonia’s military and economic preparedness be staffed throughhis London headquarters. Within a few months, French opinions regarding the Allies’ plansfor the island became largely academic after the US entered the war in December 1941. Herimmense involvement essentially marginalised such relatively petty squabbles.New Caledonia’s role became pivotal as the war in the Pacific progressed. Nouméa served asthe headquarters for successive Commanders-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet and a staging base frommainland US. From 1942, it became home to the American-Caledonian (Americal) Division,which formed the backbone for many subsequent US offensive operations in the South Pacific.Admiral Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, stated at the time:After the early success of the Japanese in the South Pacific, New Caledonia became a strongholdwhere the Americans regrouped their forces and from where the main offensives against theSolomons and Philippines were launched. 4Given the importance of New Caledonia to the Allies’ prosecution of the remainder of the war,it can be argued that the ralliement in New Caledonia was the most significant of all the Frenchcolonies. From 1942 to the end of the war, development of Nouméa’s port and her airbases—started by the <strong>Australian</strong>s and completed by the Americans—was critical for the back-loadingof battle-damaged ships, aircraft and men, and as a reinforcement and resupply node. HadNew Caledonia remained Vichy by the time Japan entered the war, its potential role as forwardbase for Japanese operations would undoubtedly have changed the course and possibly theoutcome of the war in the Pacific.As <strong>Australian</strong> perceptions of New Caledonia continue to evolve and fluctuate, it is worthconsidering the effect of these events on the evolution of Australia’s strategic interests. Fromorigins of enmity in 1853, transitioning through rancour and intimidation, to alliance andfinally to redemption in 1940, New Caledonia’s presence remained an undeniable influenceon Australia.37
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Bloody Victory: the sacrifice on th
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Human Factors Issues in Combat Iden
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The authors’ chief vulnerability
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Books of this genre are intended to
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GUIDANCE FOR AUTHORSThe Australian