Zombie Myths of <strong>Australian</strong> Military HistoryCraig Stockings (ed.)University of NSW Press: Sydney, <strong>2010</strong>ISBN: 978-1-7422-3079-5Reviewed by Dr Gregory P. Gilbert, Sea Power Centre - AustraliaOver the years, countless books on <strong>Australian</strong> military history have given rise to a host of‘zombie’ myths—myths that refuse to die. A great many have a strong commemorative andcelebratory tradition and aim to entertain or memorialise the gallant deeds of past <strong>Australian</strong>servicemen and -women. Such accounts are often heavily overlaid by the national mythologyof Anzac and imagery of an indomitable <strong>Australian</strong> national character.In this book, Craig Stockings has gathered together Australia’s leading military historians totackle ten of the most enduring ‘zombies’ that have staggered their way through the annals ofthis nation’s military history. Some might think the allusion to the ‘undead’ is a little contrived.But my own belief is that the current excesses of <strong>Australian</strong> military myth-making have thepotential to influence adversely public support for ADF operations and undermine or distortADF capability development. One does not have to dig very far beneath the popular culturalreferences to find that Zombie Myths of <strong>Australian</strong> Military History has a much more seriousand, perhaps for some, disconcerting objective to present the difference between myth andhistorical fact in the belief that ‘the truth does count’.Each chapter of this book provides detailed historical evidence that conclusively overturnseach of the following myths:• There was no Aboriginal resistance to British occupation.• ‘Breaker’ Morant was a martyr not a war criminal.• The <strong>Aug</strong>ust offensive at Gallipoli was nearly successful.• <strong>Australian</strong>s broke the Hindenburg Line in 1918.• <strong>Australian</strong>s naturally excel in war: they are born soldiers.• HMAS Sydney’s tragic loss in 1941 involved a conspiracy.• The Japanese tried to invade Australia during World War 2.• Fighting on the Kokoda Trail saved Australia in 1942.• The Vietnam War was different from every other war.• <strong>Australian</strong> interventions in East Timor in 1941 and 1999 were conducted to protectits people.110
Many members of the ADF may honestly believe that some of these are not myths at all. Somemay even feel the chapters are nothing more than the personal views of academic historianswho have selectively chosen facts to support their own biased interpretations. Nevertheless,it should be noted that many of these historians do not work in academic ‘ivory towers’.Rather, many use their historical knowledge to influence decision making for the current andfuture ADF.For example, Craig Stockings’ conclusion that <strong>Australian</strong> volunteers were ‘made’ into soldiersand were not ‘born’ to their job should ring true for those serving in today’s ADF. No-onecan be expected to enter the profession of arms without individual and group trainingsupported by effective leadership, doctrine, materiel, logistics and administration. On theother hand, a vast number of <strong>Australian</strong>s are taught from an early age to believe that suchcostly professionalism is unnecessary because ‘the <strong>Australian</strong> is a born soldier’. The historianstake care not to deny the efforts and self-sacrifice of the servicemen and -women who haveparticipated in Australia’s past military events. Rather, as Stockings suggests, ‘understandingtheir achievement as ordinary men (and women) … does greater justice to their legacy’.Readers should not reject any individual chapter out of hand. Instead they should sit back andrethink their own historical education and cultural assumptions. Much of what we know as the‘truth’ may be coloured by our own experiences and background. Our views can be skewedby those with an <strong>Australian</strong> nationalist agenda, some political movements and elements ofthe media. Many of the myths, particularly those concerning Gallipoli, the Western Front andKokoda, are ‘digger-centric’. The role of the Army is important. But much of the fighting atsea, in the air, or even on land when conducted by those of other nationalities, is now oftenthought irrelevant to the <strong>Australian</strong> military experience. The <strong>Australian</strong> Army has never foughtwithout contributions from the other Services and/or the armed forces of our allies. If suchdigger-centric myths are allowed to perpetuate, then the requirement for a balanced, jointADF will not make any sense to the <strong>Australian</strong> community, media or politicians.You may not agree with every historian’s myth-busting efforts but everyone who reads thisbook should re-examine their own historical understanding of events. Are they based onfirm historical evidence or on cultural myths? Why is this important? Misinterpretation ormythological misrepresentation of history may not have direct impact on the vast majorityof <strong>Australian</strong>s—to them it is nothing more than a debate. For members of the ADF, however,a thorough understanding of past events and the experiences of others in combat situationsoften helps to inform our decisions. Poor understanding of where we have come from inevitablywill lead to a future where we continually relive the mistakes of the past.This book attempts to lay ten zombie myths of <strong>Australian</strong> military history to rest once and forall. Whether or not it succeeds, it is an excellent and informative read and, if nothing else, willencourage readers to delve further into historical events that interest them.111
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Australian Defence ForceCONTENTSISS
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Oceanography and Force 2030: harnes
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