The first chapter, entitled ‘Jihad against Jews and Crusaders’, was issued by the World IslamicFront in 1998. This was Osama bin Laden’s declaration of war against ‘the far enemy’, theUS. Those readers who were following the al-Qaeda movement in the years before it gainedinfamy from the 2001 attacks, will recognise the wording of the statement: ‘We order thefollowing fatwa to all Muslims: the ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians andmilitary—as an individual duty for every Muslim’.This is followed by a chapter containing the fundamental canon of the Muslim Brotherhood.Hasan al-Banna’s ‘jihad’ was published before his assassination in Egypt in 1949. This chapterconcludes with the well-known exhortation: ‘Therefore prepare for jihad and be lovers ofdeath’. Chapter Three is entitled ‘Milestones’ and was written by another leading memberof the Muslim Brotherhood, Al Shaheed Sayyid Qutb. This document provides a fundamentaldoctrine of the jihadist movement. It argues for the pre-eminence of religion over politics andthe need for jihad to mean more than ‘defending’ the faith. Qutb was executed for terrorismin Egypt in 1966.‘The Neglected Obligation’ chapter was written by Muhammad al-Salam Faraq, a leading‘salafist’ thinker who completely rejected politics and instead advocated terrorism. Thischapter lays out some critical concepts, such as the ‘near enemy’ in Jerusalem and the ‘farenemy’ in ‘infidel states’ further afield. It claims that jihad is a ‘neglected obligation’ unlessMuslims choose to do their religious duty and fight. Faraq was executed in Egypt in 1982.The fifth chapter is ‘The Management of Savagery’ by Abu Bakr Naji. Naji’s writings haveappeared since 2004 and advocate continual attack against the US and its allies. On the currentcounter-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan, Naji claims that:The viciousness of the Russian soldier is double that of the American soldier. If the number ofAmericans killed is one-tenth of the number of Russians killed in Afghanistan and Chechnya, theywill flee, heedless of all else…. They reached a stage of effeminacy that made them unable tosustain battles for a long period of time, and they compensate for this with a deceptive mediahalo.Chapter Six, ‘The Qur’anic Concept of War’, by General S.K. Malik, provides a mainstream viewof jihad from a Pakistani senior officer. Originally published in 1979, this document appliesthe principles of war to jihad. Malik presents a wide-ranging discussion on the nature of war,including critiques of Clausewitz, Brodie and Liddel Hart, and considerations on ethics, strategyand decision-making. Malik argues that the aim of war is to break the will of the adversary, as:‘Terror struck into the hearts of the enemies is not only a means, it is the end in itself ’.Chapter Seven, ‘Join the Caravan’, by Sheikh Abdullah Yusuf ‘Azzam, presents the case for globalIslamic revolution. Having created an international cadre of more than 20,000 recruits for thewar against the Soviets in Afghanistan, ‘Azzam’s writings have heavily influenced bin Laden.He argues that jihad is ‘individually obligatory’ for Muslims and then describes the destiny ofa ‘mujahideen’ warrior in ‘paradise’. Chapter 8, ‘Bush under the Microscope’, by Abu-Ubaydal-Qurashi was recently published on the internet. It describes President Bush as ‘clowning’,‘passive’ and ‘sadistic’. It demonstrates how Islamists seek to utilise Western communicationsand psychological analysis to attack and undermine Western leaders.108
The ninth chapter is entitled ‘Toward New Strategy in Resisting the Occupier’. Written byMuhammad Khalil al-Hakaymah, a leading al-Qaeda intelligence officer, it describes the useof unlinked, semi-permanent cells for successful terrorist operations. It also cautions againstkilling Muslims by mistake, in order not to cause unnecessary suffering. From an intelligenceofficer’s perspective, this is perhaps the most fascinating chapter of the book. It illustrates themany similarities between jihadist covert operations and those of other terrorist movements.The final chapter by al-Suri, another leading al-Qaeda strategist, is entitled ‘The Call to GlobalIslamic Resistance’. The fate of al-Suri is unclear. He was either killed or captured in Pakistanin 2006. This document presents historical and contemporary justifications of jihad followedby a heroic description of Osama bin Laden. It glibly asserts that:The modern Crusader-Jewish, American-led campaign against the Arab and Islamic world hasclearly announced its goals: total elimination of the civilisational, religious, political, economic,social, and cultural existence of Muslims.An arguable omission from the book is a transcript from a post-9/11 broadcast by a senior al-Qaeda leader, such as Osama bin Laden or Ayman Al-Zawahiri. There are two likely reasons forthis. Firstly, such material is, of course, easily obtained from jihadist web-sites. Secondly, thesestatements are generally rhetorical rantings about current events and, for this reason, are ofless intellectual interest than the important theoretical documents provided in this book.Having read the ten chapters, I was struck by their similarities to the revolutionary writings ofLenin and Hitler. Sophisticated readers may find the writings to be hyperbolic and unbalancedbut these works must not be under-estimated. They underpin the thinking of a movement thatseeks the destruction of our way of life and its replacement with an Islamic world.Lacey recounts that he took the unpublished draft of this book to a CIA conference. He waspolitely advised that CIA staff members already had on-line access to complete versions ofeach of the documents. One analyst, however, supported the publication of the book. Hestated that his team did not have time to read all of the jihadist documents and that ‘wejust need the important stuff ’. Lacey’s book meets this requirement by providing a rangeof examples of such ‘important stuff ’. The Canons of Jihad is highly recommended for thoseinvolved in intelligence and military responses to the threat of militant Islam.109
- Page 3 and 4:
Australian Defence ForceCONTENTSISS
- Page 5 and 6:
asics of the ADF’s approach to wa
- Page 7 and 8:
Oceanography and Force 2030: harnes
- Page 9 and 10:
The warm, relatively fresh waters o
- Page 11 and 12:
In a further example, the Australia
- Page 13 and 14:
Direct threats include maritime ter
- Page 15 and 16:
Commodore Rod Nairn is a career hyd
- Page 17 and 18:
Institute of Marine Science, $80m i
- Page 19 and 20:
The nature of casualties presenting
- Page 21 and 22:
Contracted solutions in less hostil
- Page 23 and 24:
Planning implications of increased
- Page 25 and 26:
When a nation is at war, it is acce
- Page 27 and 28:
NOTES1. Doug Brooks, ‘Role of pri
- Page 29 and 30:
the further from Stanley the landin
- Page 34 and 35:
20. Comisión de Análisis y Evalua
- Page 36 and 37:
Coral Sea neighbours - then and now
- Page 38 and 39:
sources. In contrast, such trade be
- Page 40 and 41:
New Caledonia’s significance toda
- Page 42 and 43:
years, it was often perceived—by
- Page 44 and 45:
NOTES1. K. Mushakoji quoted in R. A
- Page 46 and 47:
Lasers or Longbows? A Paradox of Mi
- Page 48 and 49:
Military complexityAs military capa
- Page 50 and 51:
accounts for 93 per cent of the pro
- Page 52 and 53:
The paradox of military technology
- Page 54 and 55:
fleet is massive, with sustainment
- Page 56 and 57:
NOTES1. Benjamin Franklin, Poor Ric
- Page 58 and 59:
30. D. Korowicz, ‘Things Fall Apa
- Page 60 and 61: This new capability provides techni
- Page 62 and 63: ‘Reaching back’ for information
- Page 64 and 65: Figure 2. Chart summarising an exam
- Page 66 and 67: Fast OR typically uses established
- Page 68 and 69: the results produced. For example,
- Page 70 and 71: of findings if very short time-scal
- Page 72 and 73: Dr Tim McKay is Head of the DSTO Op
- Page 74 and 75: strategic documents signed by the U
- Page 76 and 77: • Strategic Command (STRATCOM), t
- Page 78 and 79: Geographic Combatant Commands in th
- Page 80 and 81: 8. This evolution and expansion can
- Page 82 and 83: 27. In particular, in contrast to t
- Page 84 and 85: Nevertheless, it can be argued that
- Page 86 and 87: Proposed conceptThe proposed networ
- Page 88 and 89: organisations could deploy at short
- Page 91 and 92: The PacificHugh AmbroseText Publish
- Page 93 and 94: Bloody Victory: the sacrifice on th
- Page 95 and 96: Somme as critical to the forging of
- Page 97 and 98: Command and Control: the sociotechn
- Page 99 and 100: Human Factors Issues in Combat Iden
- Page 101 and 102: The Canadian paper on CAS (Chapter
- Page 103 and 104: The Ashgate Research Companion to M
- Page 105 and 106: There is also a chapter on early vo
- Page 107 and 108: The authors’ chief vulnerability
- Page 109: Books of this genre are intended to
- Page 113 and 114: Many members of the ADF may honestl
- Page 115: GUIDANCE FOR AUTHORSThe Australian