The ‘Sea Change’ report is highly relevant to this article, since it addresses <strong>Defence</strong>’srelationship to the ocean environment, in its broadest sense, and places it in a national andinternational context. It reminds us that Australia has the third largest maritime jurisdictionon earth, even before one includes the waters off our Antarctic territories, and that the oceansoffer great potential for ‘soft power’ and creative diplomacy. This presents Australia withunique opportunities to use the sea to promote our national interests.The ASW challengeIn order to detect and respond to submarines, we need to understand, assess and predict thephysical oceanography of the region. Oceanic temperature and salinity structures have a hugeeffect on sonar propagation, while currents, eddies, fronts and the shape and characteristicsof the sea bed can all be exploited by submarines, both acoustically and for the purposes ofmanoeuvre. Surface conditions, such as swell and wind waves, must also be understood andpredicted, since they affect radar and visual detection opportunities.Oceanographic conditions vary greatly between one part of the world’s oceans and seas andanother. The oceanographic conditions of the Timor Sea, for example, are very different tothose of the Coral Sea, the Tasman Sea or the South China Sea. Marine life, uneven bottomtopography, tidal streams and currents are all factors that add greatly to the ambient noise ofthe undersea environment and can affect markedly the performance of sonar systems. As wedevelop our capabilities for situational awareness in the undersea domain, we will need toshare oceanographic information within the maritime force and with shore centres. We willalso need to create novel products to assist the warfighter and integrate oceanographic datawith tactical decision aids and weapon and sensor systems.The <strong>Defence</strong> White Paper defines the ADF’s ‘primary operational environment’ as extendingfrom the eastern Indian Ocean to the island states of Polynesia, and from the equator tothe Southern Ocean. It includes maritime Southeast Asia and waters and littoral areas of theSouth Pacific and Indian Ocean. The sea-air gap is declared to be at the ‘strategic centre’ ofour primary operational environment. This region is characterised by exceptionally complexphysical oceanography.Further afield, the poorly-understood Pacific-Indonesian ‘through-flow’ 6 affects the Timor andArafura Seas, and the Northwest Shelf. Also, ‘upwelling’ events, in which cold water is broughtto the near-surface layers by particular wind patterns, take place throughout the region. 7Around Australia, they occur along the Queensland and NSW coasts and in the waters off thecoast of South Australia, where maritime patrol aircraft of 92 Wing RAAF frequently exercise.Upwellings have a huge impact on the ocean’s acoustic properties, acting like a ‘brick wall’ inthe ocean, behind which submarines can hide.6
The warm, relatively fresh waters of the Leeuwin Current 8 flow down the coast of WesternAustralia, shedding eddies into the Indian Ocean, before continuing across the Great <strong>Australian</strong>Bight, reaching as far as Tasmania. It is unique in that it is a warm, poleward-flowing current,whereas the eastern margins of the other oceanic basins experience cool, equatorwardflowingcurrents. The Antarctic Circumpolar Current dominates the waters to the south ofthe <strong>Australian</strong> continent, and the East <strong>Australian</strong> Current 9 , one of the most highly variablewestern boundary currents on the planet, affects our eastern seaboard. In our northern waters,extreme tidal ranges are experienced, which constrain surface and sub-surface navigation.These waters are also affected by internal waves, which form on density boundaries within theocean and can seriously affect submarine trim.The RAN is often referred to as a two-ocean navy (although, in reality, we are a three-oceannavy). But although the Indian Ocean has unique oceanographic characteristics, it is muchunder-researched compared with other major oceans. The <strong>Defence</strong> White Paper recognisesthat the Indian Ocean will have an increasingly strategic role to play and that <strong>Australian</strong>defence planning will need to develop operational concepts for operating in the Indian Ocean.If we are to fight in these complex waters in our region, we need to understand them and beable to predict them on timescales relevant to maritime operations.Hydrography as an enabler of maritime powerThe task of providing freedom of manoeuvre for <strong>Australian</strong> forces is a major focus of the<strong>Australian</strong> Hydrographic Service, which is part of the RAN. 10 In view of the regional scope ofADF activities in recent years—and the <strong>Defence</strong> White Paper’s priorities of supporting a secureimmediate neighbourhood and promoting strategic stability in the Asia-Pacific region—it isapparent that maritime knowledge of our own waters, while critical, is not our only concern.Across the broader Australasian region, freedom of manoeuvre is an even greater challengeand is critically important when the ADF is required to conduct joint amphibious operations orprovide assistance to our regional neighbours. Amphibious operations, by their very definition,are conducted in the littoral, often at short notice. Mine warfare and mine counter-measuresoperations also take place in complex inshore environments. Our regional seas are shallowand, because of large distances, low traffic densities and complicated archipelagic structures,are often poorly charted. For the very same reasons, hydrographic information is all themore vital.On 8 January 2005, the nuclear submarine USS San Francisco ran into an uncharted seamountat 30 knots, in a poorly-charted part of the Pacific Ocean some 360 miles southeast of Guam. 11One sailor was killed and dozens injured, highlighting the importance of accurate chartsfor the success of submarine operations. The RAN’s future fleet of 12 large, conventionallypoweredsubmarines will clearly be relying on accurate hydrographic data for their safe andeffective operation, yet the chart coverage of our primary operational environment is poor.7
- Page 3 and 4: Australian Defence ForceCONTENTSISS
- Page 5 and 6: asics of the ADF’s approach to wa
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- Page 15 and 16: Commodore Rod Nairn is a career hyd
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30. D. Korowicz, ‘Things Fall Apa
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This new capability provides techni
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‘Reaching back’ for information
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Figure 2. Chart summarising an exam
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Fast OR typically uses established
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the results produced. For example,
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of findings if very short time-scal
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Dr Tim McKay is Head of the DSTO Op
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strategic documents signed by the U
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• Strategic Command (STRATCOM), t
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Geographic Combatant Commands in th
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8. This evolution and expansion can
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27. In particular, in contrast to t
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Nevertheless, it can be argued that
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Proposed conceptThe proposed networ
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organisations could deploy at short
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The PacificHugh AmbroseText Publish
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Bloody Victory: the sacrifice on th
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Somme as critical to the forging of
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Command and Control: the sociotechn
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Human Factors Issues in Combat Iden
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The Canadian paper on CAS (Chapter
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The Ashgate Research Companion to M
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There is also a chapter on early vo
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The authors’ chief vulnerability
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Books of this genre are intended to
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The ninth chapter is entitled ‘To
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Many members of the ADF may honestl
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GUIDANCE FOR AUTHORSThe Australian