botswana/namibia - Cour international de Justice

Namibia's Alleged Title on the Basis of Prescription,
Acquiescence and Recognition
(A) The Namibian Argument
647. The relevant passages in the Namibian Memorial have been quoted earlier (Chapter 3,
paragraphs 134 to 137) and it is only necessary to recall an example of the formulations. The
introduction to the second part of Chapter 1 of Part Two of the Namibian Memorial reads as
follows:
"The conduct of the parties for the century after 1890 establishes that Namibia is entitled to
sovereignty over Kasikili Island by operation of the doctrines of prescription, acquiescence
and recognition, entirely independently of its treaty-based claim. Although much scholarly
analysis has gone into developing distinctions between these three sets of doctrines, the
fundamental elements relevant to all three are the facts that will be established in the
succeeding chapters of this Part of the Memorial: (1) continuous, open and notorious
occupation and use of the territory in question over a long period of time; (2) exercise of
sovereignty in the territory, and (3) failure of the other party, having knowledge of these facts,
to object, protest or assert its rights." (Namibian Memorial, p.66, para. 180).
648. The Namibian Memorial quotes various standard authorities in the English language.
However, it will be helpful to the Court if the Government of Botswana offers some
authorities in other languages.
649. The standard French treatise by Charles Rousseau summarises the judicial authority in
the following passage:
"3_ La jurisprudence internationale est portée à faire intervenir la prescription dans deux cas:
a) quand il y a discussion sur le point de savoir si le territoire a été abandonné par derelictio et
est dès lors redevenu res nullius susceptible d'occupation par un Etat tiers; b) quant la
notification a fait defaut lors de l'etablissement de l'autorité étatique. Dans ces hypothèses la
jurisprudence internationale admet la prescription acquisitive, à la condition qu'il y ait eu
d'une part silence du souverain et d'autre part exercice effectif, continu et sans lacune de la
souveraineté territoriale (possession paisible). L'exigence de ces deux conditions ressort de la
sentence rendue le 23 octobre 1909 par la Cour permanente d'arbitrage dans l'affaire des
frontières maritimes de la Suède et de la Norvège ou affaire des Grisbâdarna (R.G.D.I.P.,
1910, pp.186-187 et note); de la sentence arbitrale rendue le 15 juin 1911 entre les Etats-Unis
et le Mexique dans l'affaire de Chamizal (A.J I L, 1911, surtout pp.805-807); et de la sentence
arbitrale rendue le 4 avril 1928 par le professeur Max Huber dans l'affaire de l'ile de Palmas
(R.S.A., vol. II, pp. 850 et 868 et R.G.D.I.P., 1935, pp. 176 in fine, 177 et 198 in fine, 199..."1
(Droit international public, Tome III, Paris, 1977, p.185).
[1 Translation
"The international case law is inclined to give effect to prescription in two cases:
(a) when there is a discussion as to whether the territory had been abandoned by derelictio and has become res
nullius susceptible to occupation by third States;