botswana/namibia - Cour international de Justice

105. The South African regime therefore sought to create a buffer of pliant states in the fight
against liberation forces operating from outside. This was to be achieved through a series of
non-aggression security pacts, or outright military attacks combined with economic
strangulation. Those neighbouring states which were unwilling to address South Africa's
concerns were not only attacked but were also occupied, as in the case of the occupation of
southern Angola from 1982 to 1988.
(D) Peaceful Co-existence
106. Against this background, Botswana took a policy position of peaceful co-existence
towards South Africa. She was only too aware of her lack of military capacity and of her
economic dependence on her big neighbour. As a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees, Botswana had to give refuge and succour to all those who
fled from political oppression and social injustice in their countries. However, the
implementation of this policy had to be pragmatic, in order for Botswana to strike the correct
balance between honouring her obligations under international law and assuring South Africa
and Rhodesia that Botswana territory was not being used by the liberation movements to
launch attacks against them. It should be noted, in this context, that Botswana did not
establish an army until 1977 when Rhodesia began to attack the border villages lying in the
north-east of the country, under the pretext of conducting hot-pursuit operations. Hitherto,
Botswana's stability had reduced the need for the establishment of a defence force.
107. It will be recalled that by April 1984, South Africa, apart from being the de facto power
in Namibia, was occupying southern Angola. South Africa had imposed the so-called nonaggression
pacts on Mozambique and Swaziland, and had established trade missions in all the
neighbouring countries, except Botswana and Zambia. South Africa therefore exerted all
forms of pressure on Botswana, in order to force her to sign a non-aggression pact and to
agree to the establishment of a quasi-diplomatic office similar to those obtaining in other
countries of Southern Africa: see Botswana Counter-Memorial, Annex 40.
(E) Pressures on Botswana
108. Botswana experienced the full range of pressures exerted by South Africa, which used
such instruments of foreign policy as propaganda, economic and political pressure, as well as
military power. Botswana was labelled as the main infiltration route for the liberation
movement. This was a convenient accusation because Botswana shared the longest border
with South Africa. The pressure point was that a non-aggression pact would, among other
things, facilitate the exchange of intelligence and joint patrols of the border against guerrilla
infiltration. When Botswana refused, she was accused of being an accomplice. Government
agencies and officials were accused of collusion with the liberation movement in its fight
against the apartheid regime. In Botswana's view, the cause of violence in South Africa was
the policy of apartheid itself, which needed to be eradicated, if peace and stability were to be
achieved.
109. Other forms of pressure included sustained vilification, as a bad and uncooperative
neighbour and, therefore, unworthy of western support. A border slowdown was also
introduced at the end of 1987, in order to disrupt cross-border trade and services. Subtle
economic pressures, such as spreading stories that Botswana was unsafe for tourism and
investment, were imposed. Military raids were launched against Botswana under the pretext
of flushing out guerrilla bases hidden in the urban areas. The most sustained of such raids was