botswana/namibia - Cour international de Justice

Africa not to violate her territory again, in the area around Kasikili/Sedudu Island. If
Botswana was militarily capable, the communication could have simply stated that, following
the finding of the Joint Team that the northern channel was the boundary, South Africa should
henceforth keep off the southern channel, as it was in Botswana territory.
125. It took the South Africans more than three weeks to respond on 17 November 1986
(Botswana Memorial, Annex 53). Their response confirmed Botswana's suspicion that South
Africa wanted to use the incident to force Botswana into recognising the illegitimate
government created by South Africa in Namibia. Their response suggested that since the
border issue addresses the international boundary issue between Botswana and Namibia, "the
Cabinet of South West Africa/Namibia should be approached by the Botswana Government
for a proper resolution of the matter". Alternatively, the South African Government would be
willing to convene a tripartite meeting where Botswana, South West Africa/Namibia and
South Africa could all be represented and where the issue could be finalised.
126. Botswana saw through South Africa's stratagem and rejected the idea of holding talks
with South Africa's puppet regime in Namibia. This was even more objectionable as the issue
had been resolved by the Joint Team which established the northern channel as the boundary.
Botswana responded within five days, stating that "The Joint Botswana/South Africa Team of
Experts were never asked to demarcate an international boundary but 'to determine whether
the main channel of the Chobe River is located North or South of Sedudu Island'": Botswana
Memorial, Annex 54. The Joint Team confirmed what had always been the fact, namely, that
the main channel is located to the north of the island, and that is where the boundary is. It is
therefore clear that adequate clarification of the matter had been made to satisfy normal
requirements and no further discussion of the matter was necessary.
127. The boundary dispute between Botswana and South Africa around Kasikili/Sedudu
Island thus ended on the diplomatic front. In practical terms, South Africa never again
challenged Botswana's sovereignty over the Island. No South African boat patrol ventured
again into the southern channel. The South Africans respected Botswana's sovereignty by
patrolling only in the northern channel. Meanwhile, the combination of civil war at home and
fighting wars in Namibia and Angola proved too much for South Africa. The New York
Agreements were thus signed at the end of 1988, and triggered the implementation of the UN
Resolution 435 (1978) which brought about the independence of Namibia. (Botswana
Memorial, Annex 38).
128. Botswana thought the issue was dead and buried until 6 March 1992 when a Namibian
Deputy Minister for Home Affairs summoned the Botswana District Commissioner based in
Kasane to Kasika in the Caprivi Strip (Botswana Memorial, Annexes 41 and 42). The
Minister pressed the case for Namibia's claim of Kasikili/Sedudu Island and repeated his
demands on Namibian Television. It will be observed that the channels of communication
which the Minister chose to deploy were unfortunate and out of character with the existing
good relations between Botswana and Namibia. No attempt was made to take up the issue
through diplomatic channels until Namibian public opinion had been turned against Botswana
and until Zimbabwe had indicated that Namibia was accusing Botswana of grabbing its
territory. Given the cordial relations between Botswana and Namibia, the logical expectation
was for Namibia to address its grievances directly to Botswana. But this was not to be.
(H) The Kasane Summit