GOLD Report I - UCLG

EUROPE158United Cities and Local GovernmentsIncreasinglyworthy of note arethe widespreadforms ofcooperation amongvarious levels ofgovernment basedon contractualarrangementsthe states, the administrative authoritieshave the power to first censure the actunder dispute, after which the local authoritymay submit the case to the courts. Theadministrative authority also has thepower to suspend any act it submits to thecourts. Few countries limit the power of thesupervisory authority to the submission ofcases to the courts. In France, Hungaryand Spain, the act under dispute remainsenforceable –subject to a few exceptions.In Italy however, the 2001 constitutionalreview led to the total removal of the legalchecks that had previously been carriedout at the regional level, though not by theregion. There remains a power of substitution(stepping in for the lower authority)that the government can exercise in caseswhere Italy’s international and EuropeanCommunity obligations in particular are atstake. The government also has the possibilityof appointing an “extraordinary commissioner”to resolve a problem on behalfof a local authority that has proved unableto do so. This procedure has been used toresolve problems related to water supplyand refuse disposal services in a few citiesin the south.Regional authorities can also exercise certaincontrols, as is the case for urban planningand development in Italy and Spain, wherethey have the power of prior approval oflocal council plans and can stipulate certainamendments as a condition for approval.In some countries, the power of higherauthorities to dismiss or dissolve local bodiesis only very rarely regulated by the law, andcould lead to abuses. Such cases are steadilydecreasing under the influence of theCouncil of Europe and through monitoring ofthe implementation of the European Charterof Local Self-Government.Controls on financial management can affectlocal self-government. While there has beena tendency to decrease the traditional auditsfor checking the lawfulness of accounts, thedevelopment of new management techniquesbased on the accountability of staff andofficials, and on performance evaluation cantranslate into heavier controls. These controlscan be an even more sensitive issuegiven that the performance indicators andobjectives will have been defined in greaterdetail. When such controls are carried out bya higher authority, they are by their naturepotentially harmful to local self-government,no matter that the official aim is to improveeffectiveness.The case of the United Kingdom (England)is exemplary on this. Recent developmentsthere have led to a reinforcement ofthe inspections carried out on local authorities,either directly through the auditseffected by the Audit Commission for LocalAuthorities, which can submit cases to thecourts, or indirectly through proceduresaimed at promoting better public sectormanagement (Best Value Inspection, withthe mission of inspecting all services onthis basis). If local authorities, bound bythe Local Government Act 1999 to constantlyimprove their results, improve theirperformance and obtain the qualification of“best value authority,” they are rewardedwith a greater freedom of action, particularlyin what use they can make of thegrants they receive. The Best Value Performanceindicators are set by the variousministries when these are preparing theannual budget. The Audit Commission(pursuant to the Audit Commission Act1998) must publish to that purpose areport on its evaluation of the performancesof local authorities, and classify theseaccording to their performances into differentcategories defined by the Secretary ofState for Communities and Local Government(pursuant to the Local GovernmentAct 2003, in particular sections 99 and100). The October 2006 White Paper providesfor reducing the number of indicatorsused in the evaluations from 1,200 downto 200.Increasingly worthy of note are the widespreadforms of cooperation among variouslevels of government based on contractualarrangements. Such agreements are used