GOLD Report I - UCLG

209head of the executive committee and whorepresents the SPA 16 .In Islamic Republic of Iran, the new lawregarding councils, which was adopted atits first reading by the Islamic ConsultativeAssembly, also seems intended to restrictthe councils’ room to maneuver.II.3. The persistence of the centralizedmodela) Central state supervisionThese advances toward further decentralizationare quite significant, even though, forthe most part, they are still reforms onpaper or are restricted to administrativedecentralization only. Most such reformsstill await the fiscal and economic decentralizationthat is essential for their implementation.Consequently, the standard systemof government in the region remainsstrongly centralized. Moreover, it bearsmentioning that some countries, such asOman and Qatar, do not even mention localpowers in their constitution. In Saudi Arabia,provisions for local governance are alsoabsent from the constitution; instead, theyare specified in a separate text, the 1992‘law on the provinces.’ Even this documentdoes not deal with municipalities. Rather itaddresses only provinces, all of which arecontrolled by princes of the royal family.Independent decision-making by localauthorities is allowed in Turkey, Palestine,and Iraq, but in other countries in theregion, real decisions are made only by higherauthorities, either a single designatedofficial or some lesser officials holdingpower through a complex of arcane laws.Where there is a clear, single channel ofauthority, municipalities are subject de factoand de jure to government authoritythrough their relevant ministry. This is thecase in Saudi Arabia, where local authoritiesare dependent on the Ministry of Rural andMunicipal Affairs. In Jordan, little can bedone without the backing of the territory’sgovernor; in Bahrain, Oman, and Lebanonup to 80% of the decisions must be checkedby the Ministry of the Interior, or by a governorwith regional executive powers.Other governments practice a more insidiousform of control. Under the guise of anominal freedom to make decisions, anarsenal of measures appreciably limit thedecision-making powers of local authorities.‘Cascading supervision.’ In Syria and IslamicRepublic of Iran, there is ‘cascading supervision’of lower-tier councils by higher-tiercouncils. In Islamic Republic of Iran, theconstitution specifies, moreover, that “theprovincial governors and the mayors […]must apply, within their jurisdiction, thedecisions of the Higher Provincial Council” 17 ,a fact that clearly calls into question publicprofessions of a desire for decentralization.The executive committees. Two countrieshave, in addition to local councils, municipallegislative bodies vested with executivepowers; these are called executive committeesin Turkey, executive bureaux in Syria.While the members of local councils areelected by the people, the members of executivecommittees or the executive bureaux,are appointed by more or less directprocedures 18 . In Turkey, the constitution 19defines local authorities as bodies that havea legal personality, and whose legislativebodies are elected. This, in fact, opens theway to the election of all or part of themembers of the executive committees, asmuch at the Special Provincial Administrationlevel as at the municipality level 20 .Syria’s case is slightly different. There athird of the members of the executive bodycan be recruited from outside the municipalcouncil –on the basis of criteria whichare far from clear.The ambivalent role of popular councils. Inaddition to the municipal councils, themahalle muhtarligi (neighborhood councils)chaired by a muhtar have existed in16. Id. Art. 25 et 29.17. Art. 103 ‘Of thepower [of the HigherProvincial Council]on localgovernment.’18. In Turkey, theappointed half of theexecutive council isselected by themayor from amongthe municipality’schief officers, withinthe framework ofthe ‘strong mayorsystem.’19. Art. 127.20. The TurkishConstitutional Courthas ruled that theexecutive councilsare governingbodies and that theirmembers must beelected.