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88Pacific World10. Ibid., p. 20.11. Ibid., p. 20.12. Ibid., p. 23.13. Ibid., p. 21.14. Pyysiäinen’s treatment of ritual per se occupies something under onethird of one chapter (twenty pages out of a 236-page work), comprising firsta critical review of some of the familar theories of ritual, and then aconstructive section, which is almost entirely based on two sources—Harvey Whitehouse’s anthropological study of ritual in Melanesia, andRobert N. McCauley’s critique of Whitehouse based on his own cognitiveapproach to the study of religion (with some references to McCauley’s jointwork with E. Thomas Lawson).15. Harvey Whitehouse, Arguments and Icons: Divergent Modes of Religiosity(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 50.16. Ibid., p. 110.17. Ibid., p. 50.18. Ibid., p. 153.19. Pyysiäinen, How Religion Works, p. 140.20. Ibid., p. 140.21. Ibid., p. 140.22. Ibid., p. 140.23. Ibid., p. 141.24. Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the HumanBrain (New York: Avon Books, 1994), esp. pp. 165–222. See alsoAntonio Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion inthe Making of Consciousness (San Diego, New York, and London:Harcourt, 1999).25. Damasio, Descartes’ Error, p. 174. The somatic marker hypothesis hassome very close parallels in Buddhist abhidharma descriptions of mentalprocessing. Pursuing this comparison, however, falls outside the scope ofthis essay.26. Pyysiäinen, How Religion Works, p. 141.27. See for example Timothy P. McNamara, “Single-Code versus Multiple-CodeTheories in Cognition,” in Robert J. Sternberg, ed., TheNature of Cognition (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1999), p. 116.28. Alvin I. Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition (Cambridge and London:Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 369.29. Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, p. 369.