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The Ethics of Banking: Conclusions from the Financial Crisis (Issues ...

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162 10 Disturbance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Invisible Hand<br />

to be successful in production coupled with modesty in personal consumption had<br />

ceased to be <strong>the</strong> orientation <strong>of</strong> action.<br />

Separating <strong>the</strong> <strong>Financial</strong> Services <strong>from</strong> <strong>the</strong> Value Creation<br />

for <strong>the</strong> Customer: Self-Dealing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Banks as Shady Dealings<br />

<strong>The</strong> major banks that went into insolvency had hurt <strong>the</strong>ir customers by making total<br />

losses on CDOs and certificates – for which clients had already incurred heavy costs<br />

in <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> commissions and fees. In <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> CDOs, <strong>the</strong> banks were also<br />

discovered to have been engaging in forms <strong>of</strong> self-dealing, by acting vis-à-vis <strong>the</strong><br />

investor in <strong>the</strong> dual role <strong>of</strong> seller <strong>of</strong> securitized debts and broker <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> transaction<br />

via special-purpose vehicles. It has already been pointed out that transactions <strong>of</strong><br />

this kind cannot be classified as arbitrage but only as agiotage, pure pocketing <strong>of</strong> a<br />

premium.<br />

<strong>The</strong> same is true <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> banks’ involvement in <strong>the</strong> execution <strong>of</strong> IPOs (initial public<br />

<strong>of</strong>ferings), where <strong>the</strong>y act as adviser and trustee <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> seller <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> firm going to <strong>the</strong><br />

stock exchange, and as trustee to <strong>the</strong> buyer <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se shares. <strong>The</strong> allocation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

new shares is largely at <strong>the</strong> bank’s discretion, and remains anything but transparent<br />

to outsiders. 23 It is striking that <strong>the</strong> IPO business, which was especially lucrative for<br />

<strong>the</strong> investment banks and accounted for <strong>the</strong> bulk <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir pr<strong>of</strong>its, is concentrated in<br />

<strong>the</strong> hands <strong>of</strong> very few investment banks. <strong>The</strong> IPO business, because it is conducted<br />

by a very select number <strong>of</strong> major banks, has a pronounced oligopolistic structure. 24<br />

23 On IPOs, cf. THIELEMANN and ULRICH (2003), pp. 63–71.<br />

24 Even <strong>the</strong> head <strong>of</strong> Deutsche Bank and <strong>the</strong> Swiss National Bank warn <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> danger <strong>of</strong> a global<br />

oligopoly <strong>of</strong> major banks. Ackermann sees <strong>the</strong> oligopoly as a consequence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mergers brought<br />

about by <strong>the</strong> financial crisis, whereas <strong>the</strong> view is taken here that it existed even before <strong>the</strong> financial<br />

crisis. Cf. “Ackermann warnt vor einem Banken-Oligopol. Der Chef der Deutschen Bank macht<br />

sich Gedanken über ein krisenfestes Bankensystem” [Ackerman warns <strong>of</strong> a banking oligopoly.<br />

<strong>The</strong> CEO <strong>of</strong> Deutsche Bank contemplates a crisis-pro<strong>of</strong> banking system], Frankfurter Allgemeine<br />

Zeitung, 18 June 2009, No. 138, p. 13: “<strong>The</strong> Chairman <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Management Board <strong>of</strong> Deutsche<br />

Bank, Josef Ackermann, has warned that <strong>the</strong> world’s major banks are forming ‘more and more<br />

<strong>of</strong> an oligopoly’. This not only affects competition but increases <strong>the</strong> systemic risks. ‘After <strong>the</strong><br />

crisis <strong>the</strong>re will be a few large banks slicing up <strong>the</strong> global cake – which gives rise to a danger<br />

<strong>of</strong> oligopolistic structures.’ <strong>The</strong>se are dangerous if <strong>the</strong>y collapse. In <strong>the</strong> crisis, mergers <strong>of</strong> stricken<br />

financial institutions are taking place, explained Ackermann. <strong>The</strong> result is increasing concentration<br />

in <strong>the</strong> banking sector. ‘<strong>The</strong> question in future will be this: how big can banks be in relation to <strong>the</strong><br />

strength <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> national economy, without becoming ‘too big to fail’ [...] <strong>The</strong> Americans say, if a<br />

bank is too big to fail, <strong>the</strong>n it is too big.’” (Own translation <strong>from</strong> <strong>the</strong> German).<br />

Cf. also <strong>the</strong> Swiss National Bank’s call for <strong>the</strong> subdivision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> two major Swiss banks, UBS<br />

and Credit Suisse: “‘Banken notfalls zerschlagen’. Forderung der Schweizerischen Nationalbank<br />

überrascht” [‘Break up banks if need be’. Surprising demand <strong>from</strong> <strong>the</strong> Swiss National Bank],<br />

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19 June 2009, No. 139, p. 13. “Break up” is not <strong>the</strong> appropriate<br />

term to use for taking steps to split up an oligopoly.

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