The Ethics of Banking: Conclusions from the Financial Crisis (Issues ...
The Ethics of Banking: Conclusions from the Financial Crisis (Issues ...
The Ethics of Banking: Conclusions from the Financial Crisis (Issues ...
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44 3 <strong>The</strong> Ethical Economy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Capital Market<br />
<strong>the</strong> demands <strong>of</strong> information efficiency and fulfill <strong>the</strong> liquidity function, as many<br />
suppliers and demanders as possible must be active in a market in order to generate<br />
large enough volumes <strong>of</strong> supply and demand so that genuine markets for companies<br />
and corporate strategies emerge. Globalization, by enlarging <strong>the</strong> market, tends to be<br />
conducive to information efficiency and stock market liquidity. An efficient capital<br />
market calls for adequate liquidity so that investors are not “locked in” to <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
investments. 16 Conversely <strong>the</strong> preservation <strong>of</strong> wealth and <strong>the</strong> safekeeping <strong>of</strong> means<br />
<strong>of</strong> purchasing in <strong>the</strong> capital market is a purpose which requires that fluctuations in<br />
<strong>the</strong> value <strong>of</strong> assets in <strong>the</strong> capital market do not become excessive. In <strong>the</strong> capital<br />
market, <strong>the</strong>n, important considerations will be that decisions in <strong>the</strong> capital market<br />
direct capital quickly and flexibly to whatever is <strong>the</strong> best use, but without giving rise<br />
to unnecessary fluctuations in value which cause uncertainty to savers and investors<br />
and drive <strong>the</strong>m out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> capital market.<br />
<strong>The</strong> mobility <strong>of</strong> capital and its efficient allocation on <strong>the</strong> one hand, and <strong>the</strong> conditions<br />
<strong>of</strong> stability and liquidity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> capital market on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, are mutually<br />
antagonistic aims to some extent, partly because <strong>of</strong> speculation. Stock exchange<br />
speculation must on <strong>the</strong> one hand seek out <strong>the</strong> minutest changes in <strong>the</strong> potential<br />
returns on investments and bring <strong>the</strong>m to evidence in <strong>the</strong> market. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand,<br />
however, it must avoid creating artificial fluctuations in value which have no “substance”<br />
in <strong>the</strong> net asset values <strong>of</strong> shares and firms. Consequently, speculation is<br />
meant to be highly speculative on <strong>the</strong> one hand, and must find <strong>the</strong> tiniest differentials<br />
in value, but should not produce any artificial volatility on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand. In<br />
<strong>the</strong> orientation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> values <strong>of</strong> capital market actors, a tension arises here between<br />
speculative dynamism and <strong>the</strong> stabilization <strong>of</strong> volatility through speculation.<br />
It must not be overlooked, however, that stock market speculation rewards <strong>the</strong><br />
kinds <strong>of</strong> speculative anticipations which have correctly anticipated improbable<br />
increases in value. By doing this, <strong>the</strong> capital market rewards <strong>the</strong> highly speculative<br />
speculation which dampens price fluctuations and removes greater volatility <strong>from</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> market. <strong>The</strong> popular view that speculation always amplifies price fluctuation is<br />
wide <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mark.<br />
16 BOATRIGHT (1999), p. 116, points out that <strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> liquidity options for sizeable packages <strong>of</strong><br />
shares can be a problem for large pension funds because <strong>the</strong>se are <strong>of</strong>ten not in a position to voice<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir protest against weak management teams by selling <strong>the</strong> shares in <strong>the</strong>ir companies. <strong>The</strong>y must<br />
<strong>the</strong>refore resort to influencing management by remaining invested in <strong>the</strong> company and exerting<br />
direct influence over <strong>the</strong> leadership <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> company. A pension fund like CalPERS (California<br />
Public Employees’ Retirement System) which is invested in shares with a market value <strong>of</strong> 198.9<br />
billion US dollars (as <strong>of</strong> 15 September 2009, cf. http://www.calpers.ca.gov/) has difficulty in selling<br />
a package <strong>of</strong> Micros<strong>of</strong>t shares to <strong>the</strong> value <strong>of</strong> 1 billion dollars on <strong>the</strong> stock exchange without taking<br />
a price hit. – <strong>The</strong> change in <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> capitalism <strong>from</strong> private ownership capitalism to “pension<br />
fund capitalism” can be traced <strong>from</strong> <strong>the</strong> following figures: “In 1970, individuals held more than 72<br />
percent <strong>of</strong> shares, while institutional investors (pensions, mutual funds, insurance companies, and<br />
private trusts and endowments) accounted for about 16%. By 1990, <strong>the</strong> holdings <strong>of</strong> institutions had<br />
risen to more than 53%, with private and public pension funds owning approx. 28% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> equities<br />
<strong>of</strong> US firms.” (quoted after BOATRIGHT (1999), p. 114).