The Ethics of Banking: Conclusions from the Financial Crisis (Issues ...

Corporate Governance by Consensus and by Competition 79
decision. 11 They belong neither wholly to the sphere of the state, nor to that of
society. They distort competition in the domain of the state-coordinated social economy
in that they can reap the benefits of state privileges over their private-sector
competitors.
In this respect, the dynamics of the single market of the European Union point
in the same direction as the dynamics of the global market. Within the European
Union, it is difficult to explain why the State of Lower Saxony’s large shareholding
in Volkswagen supposedly gives the firm competitive advantages over French
competitors like Peugeot or Renault, which are also partly state-owned, or, vice
versa, why this privileges French carmakers over Volkswagen. From the standpoint
of making a clear distinction between state and society, it may help to safeguard state
functions if the hybrid form of the semi-state, semi-societal joint-stock corporation
makes way for fully privatized joint-stock corporations alongside fully state-run
functional corporations which are also, in that case, wholly for the public benefit. 12
If we inquire into which fundamental values and which identifications with basic
principles underlie the controversy over the legality or illegality of hostile corporate
takeovers, we arrive at the dichotomy between consensus and competition, selfcontrol
and extrinsic control. The German model of business management is based
on the consensus principle and on the stakeholders controlling themselves. To the
capital market, it ascribes only a subordinate role in the control of corporate management,
and envisages the prime form of corporate control as the stakeholders
themselves exercising control over themselves within the corporation. The Anglo-
American model, on the other hand, assumes that consensus does not necessarily
entail productivity because when an emphasis is placed on the value of consensus,
it can lead participants in the discourse to be too easily satisfied with self-serving
solutions.
Cultural traditions and religious persuasions also come into play here. The
defining characteristic of the puritanical Calvinist Protestant tradition, as opposed
to the Lutheran Protestant and the Catholic tradition, is a stronger mistrust of
self-justification and self-control by groups and a greater reliance on the individual.
These confessional differences are matched by differences in the models
of republicanism which emerged from the ideas that influenced the American
Revolution, and from those that inspired the French Revolution. According to the
Anglo-American, puritanical model, the people affected by decisions were not capable
of assessing their own efforts due to the distortion of human knowledge caused
by self-interest – or theologically, because their will is tainted by original sin. The
11 This is probably also the reason why all Minister-Presidents of Lower Saxony, whatever their
political hue, have staunchly retained the VW Law and the problematic role of the State of Lower
Saxony as a privileged shareholder in Volkswagen.
12 Assessing the special position of Germany’s regional-state banks and savings banks presents a
difficult problem. It may be useful that they make discounted credit available to small and mediumsize
enterprises thanks to the state deposit guarantee enjoyed by these banks. At the same time,
the burdens of this discounting are paid for by the taxpayer, who is perhaps ambivalent as to the
structure of the firms in a market and about subsidizing credit with taxes.