The Ethics of Banking: Conclusions from the Financial Crisis (Issues ...

184 10 Disturbance of the Invisible Hand
they “did not set the system levers correctly”. But it is not the politicians’ fault
either; they are not experts in the system, and therefore could not be expected to do
any better. The politicians’ excuse is not entirely wrong because the system does not
actually have levers that are readily adjustable, nor a user manual with instructions
for adjusting the levers that the politicians might have been able to adhere to. The
upshot of the system idea is simply that the spokesmen of the financial sector and
politicians can pass the blame and the excuses back and forth.
The system conception must be severely criticized if it is used for such imputations
of non-responsibility. In every system, those acting within it, especially those
endowed with power, carry responsibility for the system as a whole, for actions in
it, and for the development of the system over time. If the system takes a turn for
the worse, the responsibility rests primarily with the acting persons with decisionmaking
power, who presided over the downturn. Consensus reigns that the ethos and
the action-orientation before the crisis did not improve, but shifted in the direction
of an untrammeled egotism and striving for enrichment among financial actors. For
this, the financial market actors bear responsibility. 56
In the classic style of “purely economic economics”, Posner defends the motivation
structure of the finance industry before and during the financial market crisis,
pointing the finger at the inevitably Darwinist nature of capitalism. Moral condemnation
of the bankers for the financial market crisis for which they are to blame,
according to Posner, is as futile as morally condemning a lion for eating a zebra. 57
It is normal and natural for lions to eat zebras. If it is equally normal and in their
nature for bankers to maximize their bonuses without regard to the sustainability of
their results, to drive their banks into bankruptcy and the financial system into the
most serious crisis, it is legitimate to reflect on the possibility that something is very
wrong with their nature, that the incentive-effort system of the finance industry is
not tenable and that its “nature” needs to be reformed. Posner’s position is characterized
by the contradiction that while Posner recognizes the financial industry as
the cause of the crisis, he insists on holding tight to its fundamental constitution and
motivation structure. His social Darwinism wants to defend the system, but turns on
itself and against the economic system. On the one hand, he is analytically correct in
insisting that the financial system is the cause of the crisis, and on the other hand, he
is wrong in thinking that the action-orientations of those who caused the crisis, and
who must be held accountable for it, are both unalterable and borne of their nature.
If the action-orientations in the system are unalterable and if the system caused the
crisis, the system is untenable and ought to be changed. Posner’s position is questioning
the financial system to a much greater extent than he himself assumes. If the
market economy and its financial system are to be kept, there must be reason for the
positive hope that the action-orientations of those operating the financial system can
be changed. If this is not possible the system will not survive.
56 Cf. also the “Berliner Rede” [Berlin speech] of 24 March 2009 by Germany’s then head of state,
Federal President HORST KÖHLER: “Der Markt braucht Regeln und Moral” [The market needs
rules and ethics], Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 March 2009, No. 71, p. 8.
57 POSNER (2009), p. 284f.