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Advanced Copyright Issues on the Internet - Fenwick & West LLP

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The plaintiffs argued that <strong>the</strong> requirement of a transmissi<strong>on</strong> of a material object in orderto find a violati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> distributi<strong>on</strong> right was no l<strong>on</strong>ger viable in view of <strong>the</strong> recently enactedArtists’ Rights and Theft Preventi<strong>on</strong> Act of 2005 (<strong>the</strong> ART Act). 407 The plaintiffs cited Secti<strong>on</strong>103(a)(1)(C) of <strong>the</strong> ART Act, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 506(a), which provides criminal sancti<strong>on</strong>sfor any pers<strong>on</strong> who willfully infringes a copyright by <strong>the</strong> distributi<strong>on</strong> of a work being preparedfor commercial distributi<strong>on</strong>, by making it available <strong>on</strong> a computer network accessible tomembers of <strong>the</strong> public. The plaintiffs interpreted this provisi<strong>on</strong> as imposing criminal liability <strong>on</strong>any pers<strong>on</strong> who willfully makes an unauthorized copy of a copyrighted work available <strong>on</strong> apublicly accessible computer network while that work is being prepared for commercialdistributi<strong>on</strong>, and argued that C<strong>on</strong>gress must have understood civil liability for copyrightinfringement to be equally broad. 408The court rejected this argument, noting that <strong>the</strong> ART Act did not amend Secti<strong>on</strong> 106(3)of <strong>the</strong> copyright statute, and in any event Secti<strong>on</strong> 103(a)(1)(C) of <strong>the</strong> ART Act makes clear thatwillful copyright infringement and making <strong>the</strong> work available <strong>on</strong> a computer network areseparate elements of <strong>the</strong> criminal offense. Hence, <strong>the</strong> mere making available of an unauthorizedwork <strong>on</strong> a computer network should not be viewed as sufficient to establish a copyrightinfringement. 409 Accordingly, <strong>the</strong> court ruled that <strong>the</strong> defendants were entitled to summaryjudgment <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> issue of direct liability <strong>on</strong> Napster’s part by virtue of its index. 410 However,note that <strong>the</strong> Ninth Ciruit’s earlier decisi<strong>on</strong> in Napster I held that “Napster users [as opposed toNapster itself] who upload files names to <strong>the</strong> search index for o<strong>the</strong>rs to copy violate plaintiff’sdistributi<strong>on</strong> rights.” 411In Perfect 10 v. Google, 412 discussed in detail in Secti<strong>on</strong> II.C.4 above, <strong>the</strong> district courtruled that Google did not publicly distribute infringing copies of Perfect 10’s copyrighted imagesthat could be located through <strong>the</strong> Google Image Search functi<strong>on</strong>. “A distributi<strong>on</strong> of acopyrighted work requires an ‘actual disseminati<strong>on</strong>’ of copies. … In <strong>the</strong> internet c<strong>on</strong>text, anactual disseminati<strong>on</strong> means <strong>the</strong> transfer of a file from <strong>on</strong>e computer to ano<strong>the</strong>r. AlthoughGoogle frames and in-line links to third-party infringing websites, it is those websites, notGoogle, that transfer <strong>the</strong> full-size images to users’ computers [up<strong>on</strong> clicking <strong>on</strong> a thumbnail407408409410411412Pub. L. No. 109-9, 119 Stat. 218 (2005).In re Napster, Inc. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Copyright</str<strong>on</strong>g> Litigati<strong>on</strong>, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 804.Id. at 804-05.Id. at 805. The court held, however, that <strong>the</strong> plaintiffs had submitted sufficient evidence of direct infringementby Napster’s users in <strong>the</strong> form of a showing of massive uploading and downloading of unauthorized copies ofworks, toge<strong>the</strong>r with statistical evidence str<strong>on</strong>gly suggesting that at least some of <strong>the</strong> plaintiffs’ copyrightedworks were am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong>m. Id. at 806. “It may be true that <strong>the</strong> link between such statistical evidence ofcopyright infringement and <strong>the</strong> uploading or downloading of specific copyrighted works is at <strong>the</strong> moment aweak <strong>on</strong>e. However, to avoid summary judgment, plaintiffs need <strong>on</strong>ly establish that triable issue of materialfact preclude entry of judgment as a matter of law. … Here in particular, <strong>the</strong> court is mindful of <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong>parties have not even completed discovery relating to issues of copyright ownership and infringement.” Id. at806-07.A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9 th Cir. 2001).416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Perfect 10 v. Amaz<strong>on</strong>.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1169(9 th Cir. 2007).- 98 -

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