Americas Defense Meltdown - IT Acquisition Advisory Council

Col. Douglas Macgregor & Col. G.I. Wilson • 81mobile, dispersed warfare operations against a mix of conventional and unconventionalenemies. 1 No potential adversary of the United States will wittingly concentrate itsforces to present U.S. strike assets with the target sets for which they are optimized.But to fight effectively in the environment of mobile, dispersed warfare that willinclude weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), the maneuver forces will need a neworganization for combat within a new joint command and control structure alongwith a new approach to acquisition and modernization.Fielding a maneuver force for the 21st century is an organizational marathon,not a sprint; and, one that holds flag officers and political appointees accountablefor results. This means a reduction in spending combined with a laser-like focus onpeople, ideas, and things in that order.These points not withstanding, if the next administration postpones fundamentalreorganization and reform opting instead to harvest short-term savings by cuttingbig-dollar defense programs, nothing of importance in the Department of Defensewill change. The entrenched Cold War institutions and force planning constructs thatoperate independently of any new national military strategy will ensure the nation’smaneuver forces remain expensive tributes to the past. In time, these hugely expensiveCold War forces will both bankrupt the taxpayer and perpetuate anachronisticmilitary organizations; weapon systems and ways of thinking that undermine U.S.national security by preparing soldiers and Marines for wars we shouldn’t fight whilepreventing us from preparing for wars that may well be thrust upon us.Strategic ConfusionThe George W. Bush administration urged the leadership of the Army and the Marinesto view operations in Iraq as the warfare of the future implying that the mostdangerous adversary soldiers and Marines will have to fight is a weakly armed MuslimArab rebel whose only hope of inflicting damage on U.S. forces is to engage in aninsurgency directed against an unwanted U.S. military occupation. 2 But why wouldthe United States ever willingly seize control of another Muslim country, occupy itand then fight a rebellion (insurgency) against the U.S. military’s unwanted presencein that country? 3 American military occupation seems to aggravate the problem ofIslamist terrorism rather than solve it. 4The American military experience in Southwest Asia reinforces the importanceof employing means other than raw military power to cope with Islamist terrorism.The 21st century Islamist terrorist lives anywhere and everywhere; connected by theInternet. He is known more by his ideology than by his race, color, creed, nationalorigin or geographic location and he is defined by his affinity for destructive ideologiesor intents. To the contemporary terrorist, the structures and institutions of globalizinginfluence are high-value targets. The terrorist thrives in the midst of resistivepopulations making the use of destructive and lethal force difficult, if not impossible