Americas Defense Meltdown - IT Acquisition Advisory Council

Col. Douglas Macgregor & Col. G.I. Wilson • 83some stiff conventional fighting along the way. Similar events could occur in Pakistanwhere nuclear weapons could fall into very dangerous hands indeed.In the competition for energy resources, yesterday’s ally could become tomorrow’sopponent. Army and Marine forces might well be employed in joint operations tofacilitate, and if necessary guarantee, U.S. access to energy resources. The growingcompetition between energy and food markets offers a glimpse of future conflict thatwill stem from the convergence of resource depletion, intractable, uneven globaleconomic development and large-scale cultural change. Inside the United States, afuture biological attack could result in the commitment of U.S. Army forces to quellfood and water riots while the troops quarantine large urban areas. 8Defense spending in adjusted dollars is now higher than at any point since theend of World War II. After Sept. 11, 2001, the massive flow of cash into the Pentagonmade tough decisions regarding these matters impossible, but the decline in Americaneconomic performance may finally compel unity of effort through more effectiveintegration of capabilities across service lines. 9 The question is: How to do it?What is to be done?In the 21st century, military power is no longer based on the mobilization of the manpowerand industrial resources of the entire nation-state. The requirement today is forhighly skilled, lethal professional combat forces that are capable of rapidly respondingto military contingencies on short notice. Compensating for existing deficienciesin Army and Marine warfighting structures by binding ground forces more tightlywithin networked systems won’t work and it’s prohibitively expensive. Networkingthousands of single-service command and control (C2) nodes is no substitute for anew joint operational architecture tied to a joint operational concept that integratesmaneuver, strike, and information, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance(IISR) and sustainment across service lines.The point is Cold War single-service command structures have too many echelons;too many nodes and they are too slow to act. 10 Configuring divisions in smaller piecesunder the guise of modularity changes nothing in the way ground forces operate;they do not reduce or eliminate echelons of unneeded C2, nor advance unity of effort(Jointness).As a result, closing the gap between the Cold War force with new equipment thegenerals want, the maneuver force the United States needs and the maneuver forcethe American people can afford is the problem that must be solved. Solving thisproblem requires the next administration to impose some realistic thinking on theArmy and Marines.• Mobile dispersed warfare has replaced warfare with defined, continuous frontsas the dominant form of combat for the foreseeable future. Ubiquitous strike