Americas Defense Meltdown - IT Acquisition Advisory Council

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146 • Reversing the Decay of American Air Powerindustries to the far northeast outside the range of the fighter-bombers and of SHORAN,the radio navigation system for bombers. He concluded, “We are somewhat in theposition of trying to starve a beggar by raiding his pantry when we know that he getshis meals from his rich relatives up the street.” 62In January through July 1951, the North Koreans set out to gain air superiority.The Soviet Union supplied 500 of its latest MiG-15 fighters. These MiGs could outperformall U.N. aircraft but the American F-86, with which it had performance parity.At that point, there were just 90 F-86s in the theater. The North Koreans’ plan wassimple: (1) from their Manchurian sanctuary they would establish air superiority overa small area extending south; (2) they would build dispersal airfields in this area andextend air superiority further south; (3) the MiGs would use these fields in furtherextending their reach south. In successive steps, they would leapfrog to the southerntip of Korea, having attained air superiority.The North Korean plan failed. Even 500 MiGs could not defeat 90 F-86s. Over time,they built up to 1,300 MiGs, which could not defeat the 200 F-86s they then faced. 63 Thecommunists finally supplied the latest MiG-15Fs with Soviet pilots. Nothing changed.In total, the U.S. Air Force lost 78 F-86s versus 960 MiG losses. 64 The exchange ratiowas about 12-1, even though the MiGs had a numerical superiority of 6-to-1.The B-29/B-26 bombers had been an extremely poor fit for the Korean War. Asin Europe, they had little effect on war production; they certainly did not cause capitulation.In Korea, the bomber close air support efforts had no discernable results.In the three years of war the B-29s only flew 994 sorties, losing 107 aircraft for anintolerable 10-percent loss rate. In contrast, the Air Force had overall losses of 1,466aircraft on 721,000 sorties – a per sortie loss rate of 0.2 percent. 65Waging the Post-Korea PeaceDespite the bombers’ poor showing throughout the Korean War, the funding floodgateswere once again opened for lots of new bombers, as shown in Table 4 on thenext page.Bombers dominated 65 percent of the Air Force funding obtained under the hugebudget windfall that occurred with the onset of the Korean War. The same budget windfallalso launched fourteen jet “fighters” into development in the 1950s. However, most ofthese were, in reality, single-seat nuclear strike bombers or all weather/night interceptors,with seriously compromised performance as air-to-air fighters, but they fit nicely underthe strategic bombardment paradigm. No close support aircraft were developed.The Korean War “fighter” resurgence was short-lived. A few years after the endof the war, the fighters suited for the traditional tactical roles were once again sent tothe bone yard or the reserves. Only the Air <strong>Defense</strong> Command’s all-weather interceptorsand the Tactical Air Command’s F-100s or F-105s, equipped for nuclear strike,remained active.
Col. Robert Dilger & Pierre M. Sprey • 147Table 4. Bomber Development: Korea to Start of Vietnam WarAircraft Start Quantity Produced CommentsB-47* 1948 1,700 First all-jet strategic bomberB-52* 1950 744 Carried 12 times the load of the B-17B-57* 1950 403 Twin-engine tactical subsonic bomber;built under license from BritainB-58* 1951 115 Mach 2 medium-range nuclear bomberB-66* 1953 294 Twin-engine subsonic bomber;based on a U.S. Navy designB-70 1955 2 1 million pound Mach 3 bomber;most expensive development everattempted by the United States up tothat pointF-111 1961 500 Tactical nuclear and conventionalbomber; 1,000-plus plannedFB-111 1965 76 Medium-range strategic bomber;210 planned*All started, developed or built under Korean War budgets.In 1961, Robert McNamara, President Kennedy’s secretary of defense, took overthe U.S. Air Force’s tactical nuclear bomber development, the F-111. He promoted itas a tri-service, multirole fighter supposedly capable of air-to-air, close support andconventional interdiction bombing for the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. However,in design it remained a nuclear bomber and grew to 80,000 pounds. It provedto have no capability in the tactical role except night bombardment. It was deployedto Vietnam in this role, quickly failed, and was withdrawn.Vietnam WarThe Vietnam War was the third consecutive conflict that began with a terrible shortageof fighter aircraft. Much to its chagrin, the Air Force was forced by <strong>Defense</strong> SecretaryMcNamara to procure from Navy production lines large numbers of F-4s as fighterbombersand A-7s as light bombers. As unlikely as it may seem, the U.S. Air Forcehad no active fighter production lines in the 1960s – though it was actively procuringF-111s and FB-111s and developing the absurdly expensive million-pound Mach 3B-70 bomber. The Air Force fought the entire air war in North Vietnam with agingF-105 nuclear bombers plus Navy F-4s and A-7s.The war in the north was mainly fought around the cities of Hanoi and Haiphong.Targeting was pure strategic bombardment by heavy bomb-laden fighters married toair-refueling tankers. Due to the inadequate range of F-105s and F-4s, the new employ-
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AMERICA’SDEFENSE MELTDOWN★ ★
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America’sDefenseMeltdownpentagon
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Bruce I. Gudmundsson served in the
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James P. Stevenson is the former ed
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table of contentsPrefaceExecutive S
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PrefaceThe mere notion of a “melt
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Preface• xieffective national sec
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executive summaryChapter Summaries
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Executive Summary • xvThe militar
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Executive Summary• xviiRecommenda
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Executive Summary• xixobjectives
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Executive Summary • xxiThe chapte
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Executive Summary• xxiii• Analy
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2 • Introduction & Historic Overv
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10 • Introduction & Historic Over
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CHAPTER 2SHATTERING ILLUSIONSA Nati
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28 • Shattering Illusions: A Nati
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54 • Leading the Human Dimensions
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CHAPTER 4MANEUVER FORCESThe Army an
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82 • Maneuver Forces: The Army an
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Page 154 and 155: 128 • The NavyEndnotes1 Andrew Go
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196 • Long in Coming, the Acquisi
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220 • Understand, Then Contain Am
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Americas Defense Meltdown - IT Acquisition Advisory Council

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