Americas Defense Meltdown - IT Acquisition Advisory Council

Thomas Christie • 217One big concern, also treated by Wheeler, is that finding the “right” individualsto agree to take part in such an independent panel, either as members or supportingstaff, will not be easy. Over the past 20 or so years the DOD and its components havedeliberately and systematically decimated their in-house technical capabilities to thepoint where there is little, if any, competence or initiative left in the various organizationstasked with planning and executing its budget and acquisition programs. Theresults of those years of congressionally and DOD-directed reductions in personnelinvolved in its complex acquisition programs and processes, to include the relatedoversight functions, are evident in the rampant cost, schedule and performance horrorstories that persist to this day. The situation clearly calls for a hard-hitting, tell-it-likeit-ispanel or commission, perhaps along the lines of the National Commission onTerrorist Attacks Upon the United States, the so-called 9-11 Commission, that issuedits independent report in 2004.The other aspect is the recommendation espoused by Wheeler and one that meritsserious consideration is institutionalizing this panel as a continuing entity overseeingand guiding the planning and execution of the defense program. The panel wouldcontinue to operate at least until the new administration and the Congress are satisfiedthat the DOD has reached a point of competence and backbone that it would nolonger need the external review and oversight of its decisions and processes.Specific Acquisition Process Discipline MeasuresHard-nosed discipline on the part of decision-makers at the front-end of the acquisitionprocess should curb the appetite of the requirements community and precludelaunching into a major system development that rests on immature technologies andoptimistic projections of both system costs and the overall availability of resourcesin the future. Realistic independent cost estimates and technical risk assessments,developed outside the chain of command for major programs, should inform thedefense acquisition executive as to the viability of a new program’s cost, scheduleand performance projections.The decision authority should impose event-based (vice schedule-based) strategieson programs to include meaningful and realistic exit criteria for each stage ofdevelopment and production. Only if these criteria are successfully demonstratedand satisfied, should a program be allowed to proceed to its next stage – e.g., (Dem/Val) to FSED/SDD or from FSED/SDD into production. Of critical importance isdemonstrating the technical maturity of the technologies embedded in a new systemdevelopment prior to proceeding into FSED/SDD. Sufficient upfront funding andtime for robust system and subsystem prototype demonstration and testing shouldbe programmed and fenced to enable an informed decision as to the technical riskentailed in proceeding. When a program enters FSED/SDD and subsequently encounterstechnical, schedule or cost problems, the decision authority should not permit the