Americas Defense Meltdown - IT Acquisition Advisory Council

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214 • Long in Coming, the <strong>Acquisition</strong> Train Wreck is HereFigure 1. Army Systems Failing Reliability during Operational Testing (1997-2006)demonstrated reliability vs. requirements for all operational testsdemonstrated MTB_10009008007006005004003002001000●●●●●●● ●● ●● ●● ●●●● ●● ●●●● ● ●● ●●●●●●●●●●● ●●● ●● ● ●● ● ●●● ●●●●●●●●●●● ● ●● ● ●●● ●● ● ●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●●● ●●● ●●●●●●●75 met●●●●●●●153 not met0 200 400 600 800 1, 0 0 0●●●●●●●●requirement MTB_services. These problems with attaining realistic reliability, availability and maintainabilitygoals result in increased logistics burdens on our operating forces and a de factoreduction in force effectiveness attributable to low equipment availability.More recent experience shows that, with all the streamlining of the acquisitionprocess, the number of systems failing to meet reliability requirements continues tobe a major problem. For example, of the 28 systems for which the Pentagon’s Directorof Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) submitted Beyond Low-Rate InitialProduction (BLRIP) reports to the Congress between 2001 and 2006, over half werefound not operationally suitable or assessed to have major suitability deficiencies. Thetrend in suitability results is disturbing, as more systems are going to the field despitebeing unsuitable as tested.What is Needed is DisciplineIn keeping with the overall thrust of this discussion, any recommendations for fixesto the much-maligned defense PPB and acquisition processes would feature enforcementof the existing directives and instructions that supposedly govern the process.They are the product of numerous high level, often insightful, reviews of that processstretching over some 40 years. There isn’t much new under the sun, so to speak, thatknowledgeable observers of, and participants in, this process haven’t already identifiedas problems and proposed solutions for. Pointing the finger at oversight agenciesin the executive and legislative branches for the lengthy times from program starts
Thomas Christie • 215to deliveries to the troops in the field doesn’t get at the root causes for those scheduleslips. Neither does the cyclical invention of acquisition strategies with catchy buzzwordtitles, such as TSPR and Simulation-Based <strong>Acquisition</strong> (SBA), for example, cometo grips with those root causes.The bottom line is that the basic policies and directives DOD has on the books,particularly for its acquisition process, are fundamentally sound. They incorporatemore than four decades of experience and findings of numerous reviews. Unfortunately,many of the major acquisition decisions over those years have not reflected adherenceto those policies and directives. Too often, Pentagon acquisition officials have approvedlow-balled estimates of the costs and time required to deliver new capabilities, evenwhen other independent assessments are obviously more realistic. Time and again,early-on funding for building and testing prototypes to better understand technicaland operational issues has gone by the wayside in the competition for dollars, andprogram managers have approved programs proceeding into FSED/SDD before theseissues are addressed.In most cases, by the time the technical and cost issues come to the fore in spades,few, if any, of those involved in the process can bring themselves to admit they werewrong, to cut their losses before inevitable further cost growth and schedule slips, or todemonstrate much-needed discipline by making an example of program officials andtheir contractors who have sold the department and the taxpayers a bill of goods. Bythe time these problems are acknowledged, the political penalties incurred in enforcingany major restructuring of a program, much less its cancellation, are too painful to bear.Unless someone is willing to stand up and point out that the emperor has no clothes,the U.S. military will continue to hemorrhage taxpayer dollars and critical years whileacquiring equipment that falls short of meeting the needs of the troops in the field.Laying the Ground Work for a Disciplined ProcessCertainly, it is clear that more discipline is sorely needed on the part of DOD decisionmakersand it is easy to criticize its apparent absence over the past decades. However,until incentives are in place that encourage hard-nosed decisions, whether it be inthe programming and budgeting or in the acquisition process, the department willcontinue down the same paths that have gotten it into the dire straits it faces today.As long as decision-makers are presented with inflated threat assessments; grosslyoptimistic budget projections, particularly with respect to available funding for acquisitionprograms; as well as the patently unrealistic estimates of costs, schedules,technology maturity levels and performance projections; there are little or no incentivesto face up to reality and take the heat for making hard choices. To proceed withmajor force structure and acquisition decisions unconstrained by realistic fundingconsiderations simply continues the road we are on now-shrinking and ever agingforces at ever increasing costs,
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AMERICA’SDEFENSE MELTDOWN★ ★
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America’sDefenseMeltdownpentagon
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Bruce I. Gudmundsson served in the
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James P. Stevenson is the former ed
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table of contentsPrefaceExecutive S
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PrefaceThe mere notion of a “melt
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Preface• xieffective national sec
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executive summaryChapter Summaries
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Executive Summary • xvThe militar
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Executive Summary• xviiRecommenda
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Executive Summary• xixobjectives
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Executive Summary • xxiThe chapte
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Executive Summary• xxiii• Analy
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2 • Introduction & Historic Overv
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10 • Introduction & Historic Over
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CHAPTER 2SHATTERING ILLUSIONSA Nati
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28 • Shattering Illusions: A Nati
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54 • Leading the Human Dimensions
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CHAPTER 4MANEUVER FORCESThe Army an
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82 • Maneuver Forces: The Army an
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98 • A Traveler’s Perspective o
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100 • A Traveler’s Perspective
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CHAPTER 6the navyWilliam S. LindTo
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120 • The Navy- signaling - would
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122 • The NavyAt the same time, t
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124 • The Navyforce: first, to de
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126 • The Navywarfare usually wor
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128 • The NavyEndnotes1 Andrew Go
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130 • Reversing the Decay of Amer
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Americas Defense Meltdown - IT Acquisition Advisory Council

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