Americas Defense Meltdown - IT Acquisition Advisory Council

Recommendations

Info

226 • Understand, Then Contain America’s Out-of-Control <strong>Defense</strong> BudgetTable 3. U.S. Army Funding: 2001-2009 62001 “Plan”(Extrapolatedfor 2005-2009Base BudgetRequestsBase ArmyBudget above2001 PlanTotalAppropriations(including WarFunding)CalculatedWar Funding2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total70.6 74.4 76.1 78.0 79.9 81.9 84.0 86.2 88.4 719.573.0 80.1 90.8 93.8 97.0 98.5 110.3 128.4 139.0 910.92.4 5.7 14.7 15.8 17.1 16.6 26.3 42.2 50.6 191.477.0 85.9 121.1 153.1 152.8 174.9 218.5 175.4 139.0 1297.74.0 5.8 30.3 59.3 55.8 76.4 108.2 47.0 - 386.8Figure 4. Army Division Equivalents and Budget (with Trendlines) (Billions, FY 2009 Dollars) 1130n Army Division Equivalents250n Army Budget252002015150101005500‘46 ‘55 ‘64 ‘73 ‘82 ‘91 ‘000‘46 ‘55 ‘64 ‘73 ‘82 ‘91 ‘00money to result in a smaller Army. The publicly available budget and force structuredata for the Army for the post-World War II period are shown in Figure 4 above.As shown, the Army’s “division equivalents” 7 have declined over time to a post-World War II low at about 11 divisions. Army budgets have shown highs and lows, butthe overall trend is one of growth, and the Army budget is now at an all-time high.A key equipment inventory – ground fighting vehicles – continues to age whileit also shrinks. The Congressional Budget Office measures that this inventory willcontinue to shrink even as the number of combat units has stabilized in the early 21st
Winslow T. Wheeler • 227century. It is a trend that Army plans will accelerate in future years. 8Evidence on readiness is also discouraging. Army budget materials for 2009 state theArmy achieved 459 tank training miles (per tank per year) in 2008. During the Clintonadministration, the Army set a goal of about 800 tank miles per year but did little betterthan 650. During the previous George H.W. Bush administration, the Army had a goalof 1,000 miles, and 800 were sometimes achieved. In other words, in 2008, tank crewsare training at a level less than half of what was considered optimal in the early 1990s.The Army asserts today that all units sent to the theaters in Iraq and Afghanistanare “fully ready.” This assertion is suspect. Training time in the continental UnitedStates for unconventional war has been reduced thanks to the high operating tempoand the recurrent deployments of the same units back to combat after just 12 monthsback home. Only a portion of the non-deployed time is spent retraining for redeployment.More importantly, during that limited training time, units do not always haveavailable to them the proper equipment with which to train, and the people in thoseunits get truncated time to train together – whether or not they possess the right equipment– with new personnel. This makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to achievethe kind of intra- and inter-unit cohesion that the Army has come to understand isneeded to give soldiers the best chance to survive and prevail in combat. Few, if any,units inside the United States are rated as fully combat ready, and yet when they gointo Iraq or Afghanistan they are rated as such. While the units deploying to Iraq andAfghanistan may be officially designated as “ready,” those ratings are based on thesubjective assessment of unit commanders in a command atmosphere that appearsnot to welcome “bad news.” 9The Army is not alone in facing these problems.The NavyIn early 2001, the Navy anticipated an approximate budget of $900 billion for itselfand the Marine Corps for the period 2001 to 2009. 10 Not counting $95 billion subsequentlyreceived for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Navy/Marine Corps “base”(non-war) budget was increased by $174 billion to $1.07 trillion. The data used forthese calculations are displayed in Table 4 on the next page.As with the Army, a significant budget plus-up resulted in a stagnant force structure.Over time, the trend is – again – worse: more money means smaller forces. Thepublicly available budget 15 and force structure data for the U.S. Navy for the post-WorldWar II period are shown in Figure 5 on the next page.As shown, the fleet today is as small as at any point in the post-World War IIperiod. From a 1953 high of 835 combat ships, it persistently hovers in the 21stcentury at about 300.The budget shows ups and downs, but the overall trend is for it to increase in“real” dollars. 16 In recent years, the Navy’s budget has increased sharply, mostly for
Page 1 and 2:
AMERICA’SDEFENSE MELTDOWN★ ★
Page 3 and 4:
America’sDefenseMeltdownpentagon
Page 5 and 6:
Bruce I. Gudmundsson served in the
Page 7 and 8:
James P. Stevenson is the former ed
Page 9 and 10:
table of contentsPrefaceExecutive S
Page 11 and 12:
PrefaceThe mere notion of a “melt
Page 13 and 14:
Preface• xieffective national sec
Page 15 and 16:
executive summaryChapter Summaries
Page 17 and 18:
Executive Summary • xvThe militar
Page 19 and 20:
Executive Summary• xviiRecommenda
Page 21 and 22:
Executive Summary• xixobjectives
Page 23 and 24:
Executive Summary • xxiThe chapte
Page 25:
Executive Summary• xxiii• Analy
Page 28 and 29:
2 • Introduction & Historic Overv
Page 30 and 31:
Page 32 and 33:
Page 34 and 35:
Page 36 and 37:
10 • Introduction & Historic Over
Page 38 and 39:
Page 40 and 41:
Page 42 and 43:
Page 44 and 45:
Page 46 and 47:
Page 48 and 49:
Page 50 and 51:
Page 52 and 53:
CHAPTER 2SHATTERING ILLUSIONSA Nati
Page 54 and 55:
28 • Shattering Illusions: A Nati
Page 56 and 57:
Page 58 and 59:
Page 60 and 61:
Page 62 and 63:
Page 64 and 65:
Page 66 and 67:
Page 68 and 69:
Page 70 and 71:
Page 72 and 73:
Page 74 and 75:
Page 76 and 77:
Page 78 and 79:
Page 80 and 81:
54 • Leading the Human Dimensions
Page 82 and 83:
Page 84 and 85:
Page 86 and 87:
Page 88 and 89:
Page 90 and 91:
Page 92 and 93:
Page 94 and 95:
Page 96 and 97:
Page 98 and 99:
Page 100 and 101:
Page 102 and 103:
Page 104 and 105:
Page 106 and 107:
CHAPTER 4MANEUVER FORCESThe Army an
Page 108 and 109:
82 • Maneuver Forces: The Army an
Page 110 and 111:
Page 112 and 113:
Page 114 and 115:
Page 116 and 117:
Page 118 and 119:
Page 120 and 121:
Page 122 and 123:
Page 124 and 125:
98 • A Traveler’s Perspective o
Page 126 and 127:
100 • A Traveler’s Perspective
Page 128 and 129:
Page 130 and 131:
Page 132 and 133:
Page 134 and 135:
Page 136 and 137:
Page 138 and 139:
Page 140 and 141:
Page 142 and 143:
Page 144 and 145:
CHAPTER 6the navyWilliam S. LindTo
Page 146 and 147:
120 • The Navy- signaling - would
Page 148 and 149:
122 • The NavyAt the same time, t
Page 150 and 151:
124 • The Navyforce: first, to de
Page 152 and 153:
126 • The Navywarfare usually wor
Page 154 and 155:
128 • The NavyEndnotes1 Andrew Go
Page 156 and 157:
130 • Reversing the Decay of Amer
Page 158 and 159:
Page 160 and 161:
Page 162 and 163:
Page 164 and 165:
Page 166 and 167:
Page 168 and 169:
Page 170 and 171:
Page 172 and 173:
Page 174 and 175:
Page 176 and 177:
Page 178 and 179:
Page 180 and 181:
Page 182 and 183:
Page 184 and 185:
Page 186 and 187:
Page 188 and 189:
Page 190 and 191:
Page 192 and 193:
Page 194 and 195:
168 • Air Mobility Alternatives f
Page 196 and 197:
Page 198 and 199:
Page 200 and 201:
Page 202 and 203: 176 • Air Mobility Alternatives f
Page 210 and 211: 184 • The Army National Guard, th
Page 222 and 223: 196 • Long in Coming, the Acquisi
Page 246 and 247: 220 • Understand, Then Contain Am
show all

Americas Defense Meltdown - IT Acquisition Advisory Council

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?