Americas Defense Meltdown - IT Acquisition Advisory Council

146 • Reversing the Decay of American Air Powerindustries to the far northeast outside the range of the fighter-bombers and of SHORAN,the radio navigation system for bombers. He concluded, “We are somewhat in theposition of trying to starve a beggar by raiding his pantry when we know that he getshis meals from his rich relatives up the street.” 62In January through July 1951, the North Koreans set out to gain air superiority.The Soviet Union supplied 500 of its latest MiG-15 fighters. These MiGs could outperformall U.N. aircraft but the American F-86, with which it had performance parity.At that point, there were just 90 F-86s in the theater. The North Koreans’ plan wassimple: (1) from their Manchurian sanctuary they would establish air superiority overa small area extending south; (2) they would build dispersal airfields in this area andextend air superiority further south; (3) the MiGs would use these fields in furtherextending their reach south. In successive steps, they would leapfrog to the southerntip of Korea, having attained air superiority.The North Korean plan failed. Even 500 MiGs could not defeat 90 F-86s. Over time,they built up to 1,300 MiGs, which could not defeat the 200 F-86s they then faced. 63 Thecommunists finally supplied the latest MiG-15Fs with Soviet pilots. Nothing changed.In total, the U.S. Air Force lost 78 F-86s versus 960 MiG losses. 64 The exchange ratiowas about 12-1, even though the MiGs had a numerical superiority of 6-to-1.The B-29/B-26 bombers had been an extremely poor fit for the Korean War. Asin Europe, they had little effect on war production; they certainly did not cause capitulation.In Korea, the bomber close air support efforts had no discernable results.In the three years of war the B-29s only flew 994 sorties, losing 107 aircraft for anintolerable 10-percent loss rate. In contrast, the Air Force had overall losses of 1,466aircraft on 721,000 sorties – a per sortie loss rate of 0.2 percent. 65Waging the Post-Korea PeaceDespite the bombers’ poor showing throughout the Korean War, the funding floodgateswere once again opened for lots of new bombers, as shown in Table 4 on thenext page.Bombers dominated 65 percent of the Air Force funding obtained under the hugebudget windfall that occurred with the onset of the Korean War. The same budget windfallalso launched fourteen jet “fighters” into development in the 1950s. However, most ofthese were, in reality, single-seat nuclear strike bombers or all weather/night interceptors,with seriously compromised performance as air-to-air fighters, but they fit nicely underthe strategic bombardment paradigm. No close support aircraft were developed.The Korean War “fighter” resurgence was short-lived. A few years after the endof the war, the fighters suited for the traditional tactical roles were once again sent tothe bone yard or the reserves. Only the Air Defense Command’s all-weather interceptorsand the Tactical Air Command’s F-100s or F-105s, equipped for nuclear strike,remained active.