Americas Defense Meltdown - IT Acquisition Advisory Council

156 • Reversing the Decay of American Air Poweradvice, perhaps based on the results of the first Gulf war’s 39-day bombing campaign.He simultaneously launched the air and the ground battle without a precursor aircampaign. Saddam’s regime toppled in just 21 days. American casualties were almostinsignificant. Nonetheless, strategic bombardment missions had been performed fromday one with few noticeable effects.HelicoptersFor the first Gulf war, the Army had sent 1,644 helicopters of 11 different types to thetheater, including 274 AH-64 attack helicopters. Except for some highly publicizedattacks early in the air campaign, these remained mostly on the sidelines for the first39 days of the war. This was presumably an acknowledgement of their low survivabilityagainst AAA and IR SAMS. The AH-64s launched 2,764 Hellfire anti-armor missiles.The 132 A-10s, at half the fleet size and at much lower procurement and operatingcosts, fired 5,000 Maverick missiles, dropped 40,000 bombs of various types, andmade thousands of gun-strafing passes.In the second Gulf war from March 19, 2003 to July 4, 2007, 103 helicopters werecombat and operational losses, including 32 AH-64/AH-1 attack helicopters. Duringthis same four year period of the war, there were 18 fixed-wing aircraft combat andoperational losses, including two CAS aircraft (one A-10 and one Marine Corps AV-8B).214 people were killed in the helicopter losses; 18 were lost in the fixed-wing losses.Attack helicopters simply do not compare successfully to an effective CAS aircraft,such as the A-10, in terms of either effectiveness or survivability.Historical wrap upIn sum, the combat record of strategic bombing shows very small military returns,very high aircrew casualties, and enormous cost burdens in terms of money and lostopportunities for building more effective forces.In contrast, the combat record of dedicated close-air support and of air-to-airdogfighters shows them to be real contributors to winning wars with unexpectedlylow casualties and costs. The question now is: “What to do?”Reversing the U.S. Air Force's Shrinking Forces and Growing IneffectivenessSince World War II, the U.S. Air Force has, in each succeeding war, provided less aircraftand has had less effect on the outcome of the war while steadily increasing the costs ofdoing so. The causes of these unfortunate trends are many. Principal among them are:• A dogged Air Force adherence to the strategic bombardment paradigm, imperviousto any correction from combat experience, and• Development incentives and an acquisition process that guarantees ever-